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INTRODUCTION 
 civil lawsuit may comprise multiple claims. This seemingly banal 
truth is one that seasoned lawyers and fledgling law students take 
for granted. But the idea is of relatively recent provenance, reflecting a 
profound change in the structure of civil litigation, which now largely 
turns on the notion of “transactions or occurrences.” 
 
*Associate-in-Law, Columbia Law School. I am grateful to participants in the Sixth An-
nual Junior Federal Courts Workshop for their comments and suggestions. I also am espe-
cially indebted to Derek Bambauer, Jane Bambauer, Emily Berman, Zack Bray, Kevin 
Clermont, Robin Effron, Maria Glover, Dave Marcus, Roger Michalski, Melissa Mortazavi, 
Jay Tidmarsh, and the members of the 10,000-Foot Legal Theory Workshop (particularly 
Adam Chodorow, Dan Markel, Mike Moreland, and Mark Spottswood) for their insights and 
suggestions. Kristen Peltonen, Yonit Rosengarten, and Benjamin Vitcov provided exemplary 
research assistance for which I am grateful. Finally, I thank participants in workshops at 
Brooklyn Law School, where I was formerly a Visiting Assistant Professor, as well as Dean 
Nick Allard, who provided generous support for this project through the Dean’s Summer 
Research Fund. 
This Article is dedicated to the memory of Dan Markel, with whom I became friends while 
hiking in the Colorado Rockies and discussing, among many other things, the ideas that I 
grapple with here. 
A
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A simple example illustrates how transactionalism,1 at its best, oper-
ates. Imagine that Hatfield negligently causes a fender bender with his 
neighbor, McCoy, that leaves McCoy with damage to his car and minor 
personal injuries. As the two inspect the damage, McCoy becomes so 
enraged that he punches Hatfield in the face. Three injuries have oc-
curred: the damage to McCoy’s property, McCoy’s personal injury, and 
the battery of Hatfield. The modern approach to civil litigation likely re-
gards all three injuries as arising from the same transaction or occur-
rence—the car accident. Not only do the rules of joinder in most courts 
allow Hatfield and McCoy to litigate all three together, preclusion re-
quires them to do so (or else forfeit any unraised claims).2 This is quite 
sensible. In this scenario, the carrots and sticks of transactionalism effec-
tively package together all three injuries that resulted directly from the 
car accident. Joining these claims together makes practical sense be-
cause the evidence regarding all three injuries will be similar (involving, 
for instance, the same witnesses) and because it is arguably the most ef-
ficient way for a court to adjudicate the various claims. Transactionalism 
also prevents serial litigation of essentially the same facts and the risk of 
inconsistent judgments. The beauty of the transactional approach thus 
lies in its simple yet powerful ability to enhance efficiency and promote 
fairness. 
Today the idea of the “transaction or occurrence” is pervasive. It 
overwhelmingly governs decisions about joinder (which claims and par-
ties may, and sometimes must, form part of a lawsuit),3 claim preclu-
sion,4 certain aspects of amending pleadings,5 and even whether a feder-
al court has subject matter jurisdiction over certain claims.6 A century 
 
1 See Jay Tidmarsh, Unattainable Justice: The Form of Complex Litigation and the Limits 
of Judicial Power, 60 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1683, 1743 (1992) (describing “transactionalism” 
as one of “seven shared assumptions” embraced by the procedural regimes of state and fed-
eral courts throughout the United States). 
2 Unless otherwise noted, references to “preclusion” pertain to claim preclusion (the extin-
guishment of all facets of a claim that a party could have brought in an earlier lawsuit) rather 
than issue preclusion (the prohibition against relitigating a particular issue that arises again 
in the context of a different claim). Compare Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 24 
(1982) (claim preclusion), with id. § 27 (issue preclusion).  
3 See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 13(a) (compulsory counterclaims), 20(a) (permissive party join-
der).  
4 See, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 24(1) (1982) (articulating the transac-
tional view of preclusion). 
5 See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(B) (relation back of amendments). 
6 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (2012) (supplemental jurisdiction). 
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ago the transactional approach was a brilliant innovation. It abandoned 
the formalisms that had balkanized claims and, instead, emphasized the 
efficient resolution of controversies. For all of the good that transaction-
alism has achieved, though, it has outlived its usefulness. 
Several problems always have lurked within the theory of transac-
tionalism, but modern litigation realities have exacerbated those difficul-
ties. The first inherent problem is that the transactional approach repre-
sents a crude ex ante prediction about the most efficient structure of a 
lawsuit. Unlike in the earlier example, transactionalism does not always 
operate in its ideal form. Sometimes it can be underinclusive. Imagine, 
for example, that Hatfield and McCoy are neighbors who have a long-
running feud with claims that derive not from a single event but from a 
series of disputes (say, a common-law nuisance one year, breach of an 
oral contract the year after that, etc.). Efficiency probably suggests that a 
court still should resolve all of the claims in one proceeding, particularly 
if they turn on straightforward questions and involve the same witnesses 
(say, their next-door neighbors), but the transactional approach likely 
regards the claims as stemming from distinct transactions. On the other 
hand, transactionalism can be overinclusive. For instance, two large cor-
porations might have a complicated contract, and the two parties might 
believe that there have been hundreds or even thousands of breaches 
over the years. For the sake of salvaging an ongoing relationship, the 
parties might want to isolate only one consequential claim that is at the 
heart of their dispute and not litigate every conceivable claim that de-
rives from the contract. But the transactional approach might force them 
to do just that. Both situations thus lead to inefficiencies. 
The second problem is that there has always been an innate tension 
between transactionalism’s goals. On the front end of litigation, the 
transactional approach aspires toward maximal flexibility, giving judges 
certain discretion in crafting a lawsuit. That flexibility becomes prob-
lematic on the back end of litigation, though. In most jurisdictions, the 
transactional approach governs claim preclusion, a doctrine that extin-
guishes claims that a party could and should have brought in a lawsuit 
but did not. Although the doctrine is harsh, it is necessary as a means to 
effectuate the transactional vision of litigation. But because of the severe 
penalty that it imposes—the loss of an otherwise viable claim—basic 
fairness requires that the parties should be able to predict how that doc-
trine will operate. In other words, the transactional approach requires 
flexibility at the beginning of litigation in order to capture certain effi-
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ciencies, but such flexibility undermines the predictability that is essen-
tial to the fair operation of claim preclusion. Exacerbating the problem is 
the absence of a mechanism by which parties can learn which claims be-
long to a single transaction or occurrence. Most of the time, a litigant 
will discover the precise contours of a transaction, and thus how broadly 
preclusion will apply, only when it’s too late—when the litigant tries to 
bring a claim in a subsequent lawsuit. Consequently, the current notion 
of a transaction has ossified. By attempting to be all things at all times, it 
is neither fully flexible nor fully predictable. 
In this Article I propose a mechanism that resolves most of these ten-
sions and, for the first time, actually achieves the goals that transaction-
alism pursues imperfectly. The proposal creates a completely flexible 
means by which parties and judges can determine the appropriate struc-
ture of any given lawsuit and forgo imperfect heuristics. At the same 
time, the proposal gives the parties two things that they currently lack—
first, complete clarity at the outset of litigation about which claims are 
subject to claim preclusion; and second, the power to control exactly 
how that doctrine will apply to their lawsuit. In short, it creates efficien-
cy and predictability that transactionalism cannot. 
This Article will proceed in three Parts. Part I will trace the develop-
ment of transactionalism and the robust role that it now plays in structur-
ing civil litigation. It will also identify the specific goals that transac-
tionalism seeks to achieve as well as certain tensions between those 
goals. Although transactionalism was innovative and controversial a 
century ago, its adoption in most jurisdictions proved to be an over-
whelmingly positive development. 
Part II will demonstrate why transactionalism has become obsolete. 
First, it is infected with the deficiencies that I have sketched above—it 
imperfectly tries to anticipate the ideal scope of a lawsuit, uncomforta-
bly governs a rigid notion of preclusion, and fails to provide the predict-
ability that preclusion demands. In short, through its very ubiquity, 
transactionalism unsuccessfully attempts to serve too many roles. More-
over, it does not capture a single idea but, as its proponents readily 
acknowledge, is a fluid concept. That fact is by no means fatal, but it 
demonstrates that discarding the transaction or occurrence will not for-
sake an inherently useful legal concept or one that has acquired a settled 
meaning. 
Part III will outline a new model for structuring litigation that can 
achieve what the transactional approach cannot. The proposal begins 
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with a mandatory claim joinder rule. At the inception of litigation, the 
parties must put forward all of the claims that they have against one an-
other, whether or not those claims are transactionally related. Unlike the 
current mandatory joinder rules,7 this rule does not reflect a judgment 
that all of those claims necessarily should form part of the litigation 
package. Instead, it is an instrumental rule that compels the parties to put 
all of their claims against one another on the table for negotiation. Like 
the current rules governing compulsory claim joinder, though, the penal-
ty for failing to put forward a ripe claim would be a bar against bringing 
that claim in future litigation. 
Under the Federal Rules and many state rules of civil procedure, the 
parties already have an obligation to confer about how best to handle 
pretrial matters.8 At that conference, the parties would negotiate the 
scope of the lawsuit. If the parties are able to agree on which claims 
most sensibly belong in the litigation, then the court presumptively 
would bless that agreement during a scheduling conference.9 On the oth-
er hand, if the parties are unable to agree, then the court would resolve 
any disagreements about which claims to include in or exclude from the 
litigation. The judge ultimately will make the final determination about 
the scope of the litigation. After determining which claims to include, 
the judge will dismiss the excluded claims without prejudice, and pre-
clusion will attach only to the claims that are part of the designated liti-
gation package. 
An important word about this Article’s purview is in order. At various 
points, I speak of a model that will create the optimal litigation package 
and thereby realize untapped efficiencies. Indeed, that is the goal of a 
fully developed model. In this Article, though, I assume a static party 
structure and deal only with the mechanisms by which the actual parties 
to a lawsuit structure their claims. I leave for future work the task of 
crafting the appropriate litigation unit when the party structure is dynam-
ic. Other scholars have begun to explore such party joinder questions,10 
which are complex enough to require separate treatment. 
 
7 See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 13(a) (compulsory counterclaim), 19 (required party joinder); 
see also Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 24(1) (1982) (claim preclusion); Robert C. 
Casad & Kevin M. Clermont, Res Judicata: A Handbook on Its Theory, Doctrine, and Prac-
tice 61 (2001) (describing claim preclusion as a “common-law rule of compulsory joinder”). 
8 See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(f).  
9 See, e.g., id. 16 (providing for pretrial conferences). 
10 See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, Mapping the Boundaries of a Dispute: Conceptions of Ideal 
Lawsuit Structure from the Field Code to the Federal Rules, 89 Colum. L. Rev. 1 (1989); 
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The new model that I propose will embody three novel developments. 
First, the parties and the court will determine what the appropriate struc-
ture of any given lawsuit is and no longer will be at the mercy of trans-
actionalism’s rough predictions. Second, the parties will have autonomy 
that they have not enjoyed before—the power to determine the preclu-
sive consequences of their litigation. Finally, the parties will have new-
found certainty regarding the scope of preclusion. At the very least, the 
parties will know exactly which claims constitute the litigation package 
and to which claim preclusion will attach. Thus, for the first time, the 
parties no longer will have to make educated guesses about how broadly 
the doctrine will sweep. 
I. THE ROAD TO TRANSACTIONALISM 
Structuring lawsuits around transactions and occurrences is a relative-
ly recent innovation that defies centuries of formalism. The idea has 
revolutionized how litigants and courts conceive of disputes, a lawsuit’s 
ability to resolve those disputes expeditiously, and a judicial system’s 
power to compel litigants to realize those efficiencies. 
Until the middle of the nineteenth century, courts and litigants had 
scant power to shape the structure of lawsuits. At common law, litiga-
tion focused on just two parties (or sets of parties),11 and the pleading 
mechanisms were notoriously cumbersome, technical, and unforgiving.12 
Such a system, almost by definition, was inimical to bringing together 
other parties or claims.13 Although courts of equity evinced greater flex-
 
Richard D. Freer, Avoiding Duplicative Litigation: Rethinking Plaintiff Autonomy and the 
Court’s Role in Defining the Litigative Unit, 50 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 809 (1989) [hereinafter Fre-
er, Avoiding Duplicative Litigation]; Richard D. Freer, Rethinking Compulsory Joinder: A 
Proposal to Restructure Federal Rule 19, 60 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1061 (1985).  
11 See William Wirt Blume, A Rational Theory for Joinder of Causes of Action and De-
fences, and for the Use of Counterclaims, 26 Mich. L. Rev. 1, 2 (1927); see also Charles E. 
Clark, Handbook of the Law of Code Pleading 13 (2d ed. 1947) (noting that common-law 
pleading narrowed the parties’ dispute to a single issue). 
12 See J.H. Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History 53, 86 (4th ed. 2002); Clark, 
supra note 11, at 14–15. 
13 A limited type of claim joinder was available when claims were based on the same writ, 
even if the claims had nothing else in common; however, there were no means for joining 
claims merely because they were logically related. See Clark, supra note 11, at 436; Blume, 
supra note 11, at 4–5, 9; Oliver L. McCaskill, The Elusive Cause of Action, 4 U. Chi. L. 
Rev. 281, 294–95 (1937).  
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ibility in structuring litigation,14 the influence of such advancements was 
necessarily limited as long as courts of law and equity remained distinct. 
A comprehensive account of how the “transaction or occurrence” be-
came the predominant organizing principle for lawsuits is beyond this 
Article’s scope. This Part briefly sketches that story, though, in order to 
elucidate the profound and positive impact that transactionalism has had, 
as well as the specific procedural goals that it seeks to achieve. It also 
lays the groundwork for assessing the shortcomings of the transactional 
approach, which has never fulfilled its expansive promises. 
A. The Hallmarks of Transactionalism 
The notion of “transactions” as an organizing principle for litigation 
originated with nineteenth-century reformers. It arose in conjunction 
with the code movement,15 which aspired to jettison the common law’s 
formalisms and instead create a more streamlined procedural regime.16 
Although the nomenclature was new, it harked back to equity’s aspira-
tion to flexibly structure litigation in order to resolve entire controver-
sies.17 The evolution toward a truly fluid litigation structure proceeded in 
fits and starts over the ensuing decades, though,18 and did not come to 
fruition until well into the twentieth century.19 
 
14 See Blume, supra note 11, at 10, 11, 13, 16 (noting equity’s focus on avoiding multiplic-
ity of lawsuits and permitting joinder of parties and claims that shared certain commonali-
ties). 
15 The code movement began in earnest in 1848 with the adoption of the New York Code 
(also known as the Field Code, after its principal author, David Dudley Field) and quickly 
spread to other states and England. See Clark, supra note 11, at 21–23. 
16 See id. at 22–23 (describing the codes’ most important characteristics as including a sin-
gle form of action, fact pleading, and expanded joinder possibilities). 
17 See id. at 435–38. 
18 For instance, some courts had interpreted “transaction” exceedingly narrowly, essential-
ly using it to refer only to a contract or a business negotiation. See id. at 657–58 (noting that 
some courts found “that ‘transaction’ refers to business negotiations”); John N. Pomeroy, 
Code Remedies: Remedies and Remedial Rights by the Civil Action § 650, at 1055 (5th ed. 
1929); Charles A. Wright, Estoppel By Rule: The Compulsory Counterclaim Under Modern 
Pleading, 38 Minn. L. Rev. 423, 449 n.121 (1954) (arguing that the New York Court of Ap-
peals “managed to emasculate” a joinder rule by adopting “a very narrow construction of the 
concept ‘same transaction’”); see also Clark, supra note 11, at 438–40 (noting gradual pro-
gress toward a flexible litigation structure).  
19 See, e.g., Wright, supra note 18, at 437–53 (tracing federal and state courts’ acceptance 
of a broad interpretation of “transactions or occurrences” in the compulsory counterclaim 
context).  
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The idea in its mature form is relatively straightforward. Transaction-
alism is predicated on the notion that because lawsuits seek to resolve 
real-world disputes, the structure of litigation should reflect people’s re-
al-world perceptions of those disputes. In the hypothetical car accident 
involving Hatfield and McCoy, McCoy suffered both personal injury 
and property damage. Almost every non-lawyer would regard the harm 
as flowing from a single event and quickly would perceive the common-
alities inherent to both claims. The most efficient way to resolve those 
claims is not only to allow, but also to require, the plaintiff to bring the 
two claims in one lawsuit. Organizing lawsuits around “transactions or 
occurrences,” in the nonlegal sense, expresses the idea that commonality 
and efficiency are inextricably linked.20 
Transactionalism embodies three essential hallmarks. First, it reflects 
a flexible and pragmatic vision of how to organize lawsuits. According 
to this precept, the structure of lawsuits should turn on a grouping of 
facts that corresponds to a practical conception of transactions or occur-
rences rather than technical legal differences.21 Proponents and critics 
alike have recognized flexibility as one of transactionalism’s most sali-
ent attributes.22 A half-century ago, Professor Charles A. Wright noted 
that “[c]ourts and commentators have, quite sensibly, refrained from any 
very serious attempts at definition of the phrase ‘transaction or occur-
rence.’”23 That wasn’t an indictment.24 Instead, it was a testament to the 
breadth and power of the new approach. 
 
20 See, e.g., Blume, supra note 11, at 57 (“It is at once evident that the principle of com-
mon questions is thoroughly rational. If the causes sought to be joined present common 
questions of law or fact, their joinder will save time and expense for all concerned.”); Robin 
J. Effron, The Shadow Rules of Joinder, 100 Geo. L.J. 759, 763 (2012) (“The commonalities 
approach represents a view that the relatedness of claims or parties conveys significant in-
formation about whether joinder is appropriate.”). 
21 See Clark, supra note 11, at 137–38 (advocating “looking at the facts as they will be pre-
sented at the actual trial,” that is, “a lay or nonlegal grouping of the facts into a single unit,” 
and emphasizing “trial conditions” rather than “arbitrary formal distinctions read haphazard-
ly into vague phrases”); Wright, supra note 18, at 456 (noting that “a ‘cause of action’ is that 
aggregate of operative facts which may conveniently be dealt with in one lawsuit”). 
22 See, e.g., Bone, supra note 10, at 109; Effron, supra note 20, at 772; Ernst Schopflocher, 
What Is a Single Cause of Action for the Purpose of the Doctrine of Res Judicata?, 21 Or. L. 
Rev. 319, 363 (1942); Charles A. Wright, Joinder of Claims and Parties Under Modern 
Pleading Rules, 36 Minn. L. Rev. 580, 582–83 (1952); see also Moore v. N.Y. Cotton Exch., 
270 U.S. 593, 610 (1926) (“‘Transaction’ is a word of flexible meaning.”).  
23 Wright, supra note 18, at 437. 
24 See id. at 442 (refuting the suggestion that there is any harm in compelling broad join-
der). 
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Second, and closely related to pragmatism, is the notion that judges 
should have wide discretion to determine the optimal litigating structure 
of each particular lawsuit. Proponents of transactionalism believed that 
expert judges would develop both paradigm cases as well as certain fac-
tors to guide joinder decisions and thereby in time settle “on optimal lit-
igating structures for different types of disputes.”25 
The third hallmark of transactionalism is the purpose of such flexibil-
ity—effectuating goals of judicial economy, convenience, and basic 
fairness.26 In its modern form,27 the transactional approach promotes the 
“convenience of trial,” a phrase that Professor (and later Judge) Charles 
Clark, one of the principal drafters of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, coined as a shorthand encapsulation of those various goals.28 
B. (Partially) Realizing the Vision of Transactionalism 
1. The Problem of Compulsion. Starting with the code movement in 
the nineteenth century, many jurisdictions laid the groundwork for a 
 
25 Bone, supra note 10, at 103 n.348; see also id. at 98 (noting that most twentieth-century 
proposals called for greater judicial discretion and procedural flexibility); Mary K. Kane, 
Original Sin and the Transaction in Federal Civil Procedure, 76 Tex. L. Rev. 1723, 1728 
(1998) (noting judicial discretion in shaping ideal litigation structure). 
26 See Casad & Clermont, supra note 7, at 66 (noting the efficiency rationale of claim pre-
clusion rules based on transactionalism); Blume, supra note 11, at 58 (noting that the guiding 
principle under a transactional approach was “but a rule of convenience”); Bone, supra note 
10, at 80, 85 (noting the preeminence of “convenience of trial”); Kane, supra note 25, at 
1728–29 (noting the goals of convenience, efficiency, and avoiding multiplicity of litiga-
tion); John C. McCoid, A Single Package for Multiparty Disputes, 28 Stan. L. Rev. 707, 707 
(1976) (noting the goals of judicial economy and avoiding the unfairness of inconsistent 
judgments); Douglas D. McFarland, Seeing the Forest for the Trees: The Transaction or Oc-
currence and the Claim Interlock Civil Procedure, 12 Fla. Coastal L. Rev. 247, 301 (2011) 
(“The goal of rules of procedure is to draw all factually related matters into a single action 
that can conveniently and efficiently be resolved in one case.”).  
27 The codes’ conception of a “transaction” was still tethered to a rigid belief in the inher-
ent distinctness of rights, remedies, and procedure, whereas the “transaction or occurrence” 
of which the twentieth-century reformers spoke was much more flexible and pragmatic. See 
Bone, supra note 10, at 102; see also Douglas D. McFarland, In Search of the Transaction or 
Occurrence: Counterclaims, 40 Creighton L. Rev. 699, 705 (2007) (“Clark believed strongly 
a cause of action was fact-based, a set of facts that a lay person would expect to be tried to-
gether without regard to legal rights or duties; one cause of action could contain several legal 
theories of recovery.”). 
28 See Bone, supra note 10, at 85. Other scholars have noted that while such goals often 
will be complementary, they also can reflect different actors’ perspectives. See Effron, supra 
note 20, at 767 (contrasting litigants’ interest in private efficiency and fairness with the judi-
cial system’s interest in conserving public resources); see also Bone, supra note 10, at 110 
(noting the “tension between trial convenience and litigant autonomy”). 
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transactional approach to litigation by liberally authorizing the joinder of 
claims in a single lawsuit.29 Some moved more speedily (and logically) 
than others in that direction.30 Today, figuring out what jurisdictions al-
low in terms of claim joinder is remarkably easy: everything.31 Permis-
sive claim joinder rules now go well beyond the transaction or occur-
rence. Federal and most state rules allow parties to bring virtually any 
claim against an opposing party, regardless of whether that claim is re-
lated to the original litigation.32 
By the middle of the twentieth century, the real work no longer lay in 
ascertaining what the rules allowed but, instead, what they required. A 
truly transactional approach to structuring litigation would have been 
impossible without a combination of both carrots (liberal permissive 
joinder rules) and sticks (claim preclusion and mandatory joinder rules). 
Professor Clark always recognized that the two were complementary 
and equally necessary.33 The task thus centered on discerning the Goldi-
locks principle of compulsion—how much is “just right.” 
Despite the general progress toward a transactional vision of litiga-
tion, courts initially were skeptical of rules that would have forced par-
ties to bring all of the claims that fell within an amoeba-like definition of 
 
29 See Clark, supra note 11, at 128–29; see also Pomeroy, supra note 18, § 333, at 510–12 
(noting the codes’ “exceedingly general and vague clause permitting the union of causes of 
action arising out of the same transaction, or transactions connected with the same subject of 
action”). 
30 Some code jurisdictions fully embraced a policy of liberal claim joinder. See Blume, 
supra note 11, at 20–21 (Kansas); id. at 24 (New Jersey); id. at 30 (Michigan); id. at 21 (Eng-
land). Others drew “arbitrary and illogical” boundaries that hampered joinder. Id. at 26 (crit-
icizing the codes of Arizona and New York). 
31 Well, almost everything. Exceptions to the overarching rule need not detain the analysis 
at this point, even though certain procedural quirks can make the rule less than absolute. See, 
e.g., infra notes 100–02 and accompanying text (discussing exhaustion requirements that 
prevent litigants from bringing certain claims immediately). 
32 See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 13(b) (allowing defendants to bring counterclaims that are not 
transactionally related), 18(a) (permitting a party who is already asserting a claim against an 
opposing party to bring “as many claims as it has” against that opposing party). Nearly every 
state has similar rules that permit plaintiffs and defendants to bring claims that are not trans-
actionally related to the original lawsuits. The exceptions basically prove the rule. See, e.g., 
Connecticut Practice Book § 10-10 (1998) (requiring that counterclaims arise from an under-
lying transaction). 
33 See Clark, supra note 11, at 144 (arguing that “rules of repose should have even more 
force now in days of free amendment; a litigant has every opportunity to present the merits 
in the first suit”). 
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“transaction or occurrence.”34 The skepticism was in some ways under-
standable. Extending the transactional approach to claim preclusion and 
mandatory joinder rules imposed a draconian penalty—the loss of an 
otherwise viable claim that a court, with hindsight, deemed to be part of 
a transaction or occurrence that parties had litigated in an earlier lawsuit. 
Many of the misgivings stemmed from a conundrum that I elucidate 
more fully below, even if opponents of the transactional approach did 
not express themselves in such terms. Transactionalism was supposed to 
embrace flexibility in structuring a lawsuit at the beginning of litigation, 
and its effectiveness in doing so depended on a certain level of compul-
sion. But that compulsion—in the form of claim preclusion—required 
the exact opposite of flexibility. In order to apply fairly, preclusion 
needed to have a fixed and predictable scope. 
Professor Clark acknowledged the concern about closing the door on 
viable claims,35 particularly given the inherent vagueness of what consti-
tuted a transaction or occurrence.36 Nonetheless, he argued that such 
compulsion—to the full extent of a transaction or occurrence—was vital 
to achieving the efficiencies that inhere in the transactional structure of 
litigation, and that courts should enforce the obligation rigorously.37 
Today most states and the District of Columbia have adopted the 
transactional structure of litigation, at least in theory.38 While all juris-
dictions have generous permissive joinder rules, the majority also force 
 
34 A comprehensive survey in the 1940s found gradual but incomplete progress toward a 
full vindication of the transactional view of litigation. See Schopflocher, supra note 22, at 
324–28 (finding wide acceptance of the transactional approach in tort cases involving single 
loss but different theories of recovery); id. at 335–38 (finding resistance to the transactional 
approach in contracts cases involving single loss but different theories of recovery); id. at 
350–51 (finding division of authority on whether to adopt the transactional approach in 
property cases). Other commentators expressed skepticism about the transactional approach 
to claim preclusion. See, e.g., Note, Problems of Res Judicata Created by Expanding “Cause 
of Action” Under Code Pleading, 104 U. Pa. L. Rev. 955, 972–73 (1956) (arguing that the 
transactional approach to preclusion should not trump party autonomy and is appropriate on-
ly if it generally corresponds to parties’ desires and expectations for litigation). 
35 See Clark, supra note 11, at 144 (“There is a fear of shutting off action by a party who 
may seem not to have presented his case any too well in earlier litigation he has lost . . . .”). 
36 See id. (noting that transactionalism was “too broad and too vague to settle questions 
of res judicata and the splitting of causes”); see also id. at 145. 
37 See id. at 144–45. 
38 At present, thirty-four states and the District of Columbia have adopted the transactional 
approach to claim preclusion, and several other states incorporate elements of the transac-
tional approach. See Appendix A. Moreover, the overwhelming majority of jurisdictions—
forty states and the District of Columbia—have adopted a compulsory counterclaim rule 
similar to that of Federal Rule 13(a). See Appendix B. 
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both plaintiffs and defendants to bring all of their transactionally related 
claims in one lawsuit. For plaintiffs, that compulsion usually does not 
derive from an explicit joinder requirement,39 but instead from the com-
mon-law doctrine of claim preclusion,40 which most states now define in 
transactional terms.41 Consequently, a plaintiff who does not bring all 
transactionally related claims in one proceeding is barred from bringing 
any such claims in later lawsuits. For defendants, the compulsion is 
more direct—a compulsory counterclaim rule. Typical language in such 
rules requires that a defendant “must state as a counterclaim any claim 
that . . . arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject 
matter of the opposing party’s claim.”42 The consequence of a defend-
ant’s failure to bring such a counterclaim is “estoppel” or “waiver” of 
the claim.43 Notwithstanding slight terminological differences over the 
years,44 the modern concept of preclusion applies to both plaintiffs and 
defendants and largely operates in the same way with regard to all par-
ties—barring them from asserting a transactionally related claim in sub-
sequent litigation.45 
 
39 But cf. Mich. Ct. R. 2.203(A) (requiring a “pleader,” including a plaintiff, to “join every 
claim that the pleader has against that opposing party at the time of serving the pleading, if it 
arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the action”). The 
Michigan rule of mandatory claim joinder for plaintiffs is anomalous. 
40 See Casad & Clermont, supra note 7, at 61, 67 (describing claim preclusion as a “com-
mon-law rule of compulsory joinder”); Wright, supra note 18, at 428–29. Louisiana and Vir-
ginia have adopted a transactional approach to claim preclusion by statute and court rule, 
respectively. See La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13:4231 (West 2012); Va. Sup. Ct. R. 1:6(a). 
41 See Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 24(1) (1982) (“[T]he claim extinguished in-
cludes all rights of the plaintiff to remedies against the defendant with respect to all or any 
part of the transaction, or series of connected transactions, out of which the action arose.” 
(emphasis added)); see also Appendix A. 
42 See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 13(a).  
43 Wright, supra note 18, at 428–29; see 6 Charles A. Wright et al., Federal Practice and 
Procedure § 1417 (3d ed. 2010). 
44 In early work regarding compulsory counterclaims, Professor Wright preferred to call 
the preclusion that attends such counterclaims “estoppel.” See Wright, supra note 18, at 429. 
The modern approach eschews any distinction in how the doctrine operates with respect to 
plaintiffs and defendants. See, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 22 & cmt. e 
(1982). In accordance with the modern understanding, I use the term “preclusion” to encom-
pass both the traditional concept of claim preclusion that applies to plaintiffs and also the 
consequences of a defendant’s failure to bring a compulsory counterclaim.  
45 Early commentators preferred not to describe a counterclaim as falling within the scope 
of claim preclusion precisely because estoppel might be more flexible and subject to equita-
ble exceptions. See Wright, supra note 18, at 429 (arguing that estoppel is “a more flexible 
tool”); see also Schopflocher, supra note 22, at 364 (arguing for similar flexibility). In fact, 
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2. The Contours of Transactionalism. Although the transactional ap-
proach has become pervasive, the question remains: What counts as part 
of a transaction or occurrence? Although the term has been a fixture of 
civil litigation in most jurisdictions for several decades, it still resists a 
hard-and-fast definition.46 In some ways, that is the point. After all, one 
of transactionalism’s supposed attributes is an innate flexibility that al-
lows courts to structure litigation in a way that best effectuates the goals 
of efficiency and convenience. 
Courts and scholars have attempted to articulate various tests of trans-
actionalism.47 In the context of counterclaims, they generally agree that 
the best test inquires whether there is a “logical relationship” between 
the defendant’s counterclaim and the underlying action.48 Although it 
accurately conveys the expansiveness of transactions and occurrences, it 
does not necessarily provide a firm analytical toehold for courts and liti-
gants.49 In the claim preclusion context, other scholars have offered 
something of a negative definition to demonstrate the breadth of transac-
tions and occurrences. Professors Robert Casad and Kevin Clermont’s 
treatise notes that a transaction may encompass different harms, differ-
ent evidence, different legal theories, different remedies, and even a se-
 
however, claim preclusion and estoppel have acquired the same rigidity. See infra notes 99–
117 and accompanying text.  
46 See Moore v. N.Y. Cotton Exch., 270 U.S. 593, 610 (1926); Wright, supra note 18, at 
437; see also Effron, supra note 20, at 772 (noting that the inherent vagueness of the term 
“transaction” “is a long-standing complaint”).  
47 For counterclaims, courts generally recognize four tests: (1) whether the claims present 
the same issues of law or fact; (2) whether preclusion would bar a subsequent lawsuit that 
attempts to raise the claim; (3) whether the same or similar evidence would support both the 
original claim and the counterclaim; and (4) whether there is a logical relationship between 
the claims. See McFarland, supra note 27, at 709–13; see also, e.g., Tank Insulation Int’l, 
Inc. v. Insultherm, Inc., 104 F.3d 83, 85–86 (5th Cir. 1997); FDIC v. Hulsey, 22 F.3d 1472, 
1487 (10th Cir. 1994); Maddox v. Ky. Fin. Co., 736 F.2d 380, 382 (6th Cir. 1984); Sue & 
Sam Mfg. Co. v. B-L-S Constr. Co., 538 F.2d 1048, 1051–53 (4th Cir. 1976); cf. Nasalok 
Coating Corp. v. Nylok Corp., 522 F.3d 1320, 1325–26, 1326 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (recogniz-
ing the first, third, and fourth tests but rejecting the second test). 
48 See 6 Wright et al., supra note 43, § 1410, at 58–59; McFarland, supra note 27, at 713; 
Wright, supra note 18, at 440–42; see also Effron, supra note 20, at 778 (treating the “logical 
relationship” test as authoritative); Michael D. Conway, Comment, Narrowing the Scope of 
Rule 13(a), 60 U. Chi. L. Rev. 141, 151 (1993) (arguing that “the logical relationship 
test . . . is the most expansive and commonly used”).  
49 See Robin J. Effron, Letting the Perfect Become the Enemy of the Good: The Related-
ness Problem in Personal Jurisdiction, 16 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 867, 893–94 (2012); 
McFarland, supra note 27, at 713 (describing criticisms of the test). But see Wright, supra 
note 18, at 442–43 (arguing that the “logical relationship” test best captures how transaction-
alism works in teasing out litigation efficiencies).  
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ries of related events.50 The point is the same—transactionalism, in its 
breadth and malleability, defies legalistic categories. 
The various tests and formulations often sound like exercises in de-
scribing and reiterating the hallmarks and goals of the transactional ap-
proach. That probably cannot be helped. But it is cold comfort to a liti-
gant trying to predict exactly what counts as part of a transaction. 
3. The Aspirational Symmetry of Transactionalism. Symmetry across 
different procedural devices is among the principal virtues to which 
transactionalism aspires. Liberal joinder rules allow litigants, at a bare 
minimum, to join all of the claims that form part of the same transaction 
or occurrence.51 In fact, joinder rules are even broader in nearly every 
jurisdiction. 
The transactional approach also governs which claims a party must 
bring.52 For plaintiffs, such compulsion usually flows from claim preclu-
sion;53 for defendants, it typically comes in the form of the compulsory 
counterclaim rule, which most jurisdictions have adopted.54 Consequent-
ly, plaintiffs and defendants in most jurisdictions face the same degree 
of compulsion.55 
Transactionalism extends to other rules and devices, including certain 
amendments to pleadings56 and party joinder mechanisms.57 Moreover, 
 
50 Casad & Clermont, supra note 7, at 68. 
51 See supra notes 31–32 and accompanying text. 
52 See Casad & Clermont, supra note 7, at 66 (arguing that “once procedural rules for 
pleading, discovery, and amendment have become liberal enough to permit the parties to lit-
igate fully the whole transaction in one lawsuit,” an equally broad rule of claim preclusion 
“would not be unfair”). 
53 See id. at 67; Wright, supra note 18, at 456; see also Mich. Ct. R. 2.203(A) (compulsory 
joinder rule for plaintiffs).  
54 See Appendix B (noting that forty states and the District of Columbia have adopted 
compulsory counterclaim rules). 
55 See Wright, supra note 18, at 456; see also Appendices A and B. As some commentators 
have noted, though, a mismatch can arise when a state defines claim preclusion for plaintiffs 
more narrowly than a transaction or occurrence but defines compulsory counterclaims in 
broad transactional terms. See Arthur F. Greenbaum, Jacks or Better to Open: Procedural 
Limitations on Co-Party and Third-Party Claims, 74 Minn. L. Rev. 507, 541 n.160 (1990); 
see also Conway, supra note 48, at 144–46 (similarly noting an “asymmetry” in how preclu-
sion applies to plaintiffs and defendants in some states). For example, the Appendices show 
that Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Nevada, North Carolina, and West Virginia have 
adopted the “same evidence” test for claim preclusion as applied to plaintiffs, a test that the-
oretically is narrower than the transactional test. But all of those states also have adopted 
compulsory counterclaim rules that sound in transactionalism. 
56 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c) (relation back of amendments to pleadings). 
57 See, e.g., id. 20(a) (permissive party joinder). 
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in federal court, transactionalism even governs certain jurisdictional 
questions.58 
The upshot is that the structure of modern civil litigation overwhelm-
ingly turns on the transactional approach. Although the evolution toward 
transactionalism represented a marked improvement over earlier proce-
dural regimes, the approach is plagued with defects, some of which are 
inherent and some of which developed insidiously over several decades. 
I turn in the following Part to these problems. 
II. PATHOLOGIES OF TRANSACTIONALISM 
The transactional approach represented a fundamental shift in think-
ing about how to structure lawsuits. It dispensed with legal formalisms 
in favor of flexibility, and it broadly empowered courts and litigants to 
realize the efficiencies of litigating related claims together. In short, it 
was a brilliant innovation. But its time has passed. 
Transactionalism, in its modern incarnation, creates several patholo-
gies. I speak of how the transactional approach operates today because 
although some of the pathologies always lay dormant within the idea of 
transactions or occurrences, the nature of modern litigation has exacer-
bated the problems. The most conspicuous pathology is the failure to 
create the optimal lawsuit size for resolving disputes. Lawsuits often be-
come inefficiently bloated with too many claims. Moreover, the transac-
tional approach fosters unpredictability in the realm of claim preclusion, 
thus undermining autonomy and basic fairness. This Part discusses those 
pathologies and ends by noting that the supposed symmetry of the trans-
actional approach breaks down, thus suggesting that it is not an inherent-
ly meaningful concept. 
A. The Inefficiency of Transactionalism 
Since its inception, the transactional approach to structuring litigation 
always has faced precarious tensions and ambiguities. Early proponents 
 
58 When claims fail to satisfy the requirements of either federal question jurisdiction, see 
28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2012), or diversity jurisdiction, see id. § 1332, federal courts nonetheless 
may assert supplemental jurisdiction over claims that are transactionally related to the litiga-
tion. See id. § 1367(a) (presumptively extending jurisdiction “over all other claims that are 
so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the 
same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution”). But see id. 
§ 1367(b) (partially curtailing the reach of supplemental jurisdiction). 
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of the approach recognized those problems, but they also regarded any 
potential defects as corrigible and remained convinced that transaction-
alism would promote the most efficient resolution of conflicts. The na-
ture of litigation has changed profoundly in recent decades, though, thus 
undercutting some of transactionalism’s most fundamental assumptions. 
As those assumptions erode, so too does transactionalism’s capacity to 
promote the efficient resolution of controversies. 
1. Transactionalism’s Inherent Mismatch. There was always the risk 
that structuring lawsuits around transactions or occurrences would not 
lead to the most efficient litigation unit. The problem is that the transac-
tional approach has to reconcile two policies that never could coexist 
easily—flexibility (on the front end of litigation) and predictability (on 
the back end). 
Transactionalism relied on the new liberality of joinder rules and un-
precedented flexibility at the beginning of a lawsuit so that parties and 
judges could create the optimal structure for their lawsuit.59 As noted 
above,60 though, the progenitors of the transactional approach recog-
nized that merely allowing parties to litigate more claims would not nec-
essarily lead to the most efficient and socially optimal litigation pack-
age. The transactional vision could not come to fruition without the 
compulsion of preclusion rules. Accordingly, transactionalism governs 
joinder decisions at the inception of litigation and also the sanctions that 
apply if a party fails to bring all transactionally related claims. At first 
blush, that seems sensible and appears to create a certain symmetry. But 
the flexibility that is among transactionalism’s defining attributes—and 
arguably works well at the beginning of a lawsuit—becomes problemat-
ic in the claim preclusion context. Precisely because preclusion extin-
guishes unlitigated claims, basic fairness requires that parties should 
have the ability to predict how those penalties will apply. Consequently, 
claim preclusion requires the crisp delineation that transactionalism 
sought to avoid. 
Simply put, transactionalism governs disparate questions and thus at-
tempts to do too much. In a slightly different context, Professor Howard 
Erichson has observed that “preclusion is backward-looking, while join-
 
59 See supra notes 29–33 and accompanying text. 
60 See supra notes 33–37 and accompanying text. 
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der is forward-looking.”61 Those dynamics lead to the potential tension. 
Although maximal flexibility might be desirable when making forward-
looking decisions about the most efficient structure of a given lawsuit, 
such flexibility—when applied in hindsight to the draconian doctrine of 
preclusion—can upset settled expectations and lead to severe unfairness. 
Early proponents were not entirely blind to this potential tension. 
Specifically, they recognized that the notion of a transaction or occur-
rence could be ambiguous and thus undermine the predictability that is 
essential to the fair operation of claim preclusion.62 They insisted, how-
ever, that there was no practical problem. If anything, the ambiguity cre-
ated a desirable incentive structure for parties to effectuate the broadest 
possible joinder of claims.63 Litigants faced with the question of whether 
a particular claim or counterclaim is part of the same transaction or oc-
currence likely will err on the side of inclusion in order to avoid the pro-
spect of effectively losing those claims.64 Many proponents of the trans-
actional approach believed that the more claims a court could resolve in 
one proceeding, the better. Consistent with this general view, some early 
scholars wanted to go further than the transactional requirement and 
mandate that the parties join together all of the claims that they had 
against one another.65 The ambiguity of the transactional approach to 
preclusion thus was not, in their minds, a source of unfairness; instead, it 
simply encouraged parties to take full advantage of broad joinder rules. 
Those incentives would enable courts to resolve as many claims as pos-
sible in a single proceeding, an approach that in most instances would 
lead to the greatest efficiency. Scholars recognized that an occasional 
 
61 Howard M. Erichson, Of Horror Stories and Happy Endings: The Rise and Fall of Pre-
clusion-Based Compulsory Party Joinder Under the New Jersey Entire Controversy Doc-
trine, 9 Seton Hall Const. L.J. 757, 773 (1999). 
62 See, e.g., Clark, supra note 11, at 144 (noting “objections raised by certain acute critics” 
who regarded transactionalism as “too broad and too vague to settle questions of res judicata 
and the splitting of causes”). 
63 See id. at 144–45. 
64 See id. at 144 (noting that “a litigant has every opportunity to present the merits in the 
first suit”); Blume, supra note 11, at 58–59 (noting that “[j]oinder should be encouraged” 
regardless of whether the various claims are part of the same transaction or occurrence); 
Wright, supra note 18, at 433 (“[T]hus the careful attorney can and will plead all his client’s 
claims as counterclaims if there is any reason at all to think that they may be compulsory.”); 
see also Effron, supra note 20, at 761 (“Litigants are taught to rely on the liberal rules of 
joinder to build their lawsuits . . . .”).  
65 See Blume, supra note 11, at 58–59; see also Clark, supra note 11, at 145–46 (endorsing 
Blume’s view that expansion of compulsory claim joinder rules would be beneficial, but ex-
pressing skepticism that such further expansion would be achievable). 
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lawsuit might become unwieldy, but they argued that the solution was 
simple: A court could always order separate trials.66 
2. New Litigation Realities. In the early twentieth century, the poten-
tial mismatch between joinder and preclusion’s respective premises—
flexibility and predictability—might have been only that: a mere poten-
tiality. Several decades later, though, it had become an insidious reality. 
Two of the fundamental assumptions underlying transactionalism 
have eroded. First, litigation has become significantly more complex 
than it was many decades ago; and second, most cases do not actually 
proceed to trial. The interaction of those two new realities has denuded 
transactionalism of its power to create the most efficient litigation unit. 
Several generations ago, scholars probably were correct to assume 
that resolving as many claims as possible in one lawsuit would be both 
practicable and desirable. At mid-century, a substantial majority of law-
suits involved negligence actions stemming from car accidents.67 A law-
suit focused primarily on a car accident likely comprised a handful of 
individuals and probably was capable of handling any of the discrete 
claims that they had against one another. An incentive structure that en-
couraged the parties to include more, rather than fewer, claims probably 
enhanced judicial efficiency by allowing a court to resolve all of those 
discrete issues more expeditiously. But in an era in which complex cases 
can involve hundreds or thousands of parties, even more claims, and po-
tentially cumbersome discovery,68 the intuition that “more is better” 
 
66 See Blume, supra note 11, at 58; William W. Blume, The Scope of a Civil Action, 42 
Mich. L. Rev. 257, 266–67 (1943) [hereinafter Blume, Scope of a Civil Action]; Wright, su-
pra note 18, at 443. 
67 See Wright, supra note 18, at 459 (noting that “accident cases make up the bulk of litiga-
tion today” and quoting judicial opinions recognizing the same); see also Judith Resnik, Fail-
ing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U. Chi. L. Rev. 494, 508 (1986) (noting 
that the typical federal civil case at the time of the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure in 1938 involved tortious injury or breach-of-contract actions between private par-
ties). 
68 See J. Maria Glover, The Federal Rules of Civil Settlement, 87 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1713, 
1721 (2012) (noting that “cases have grown in complexity and scope, especially in light of 
modern class action practice”); Richard L. Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading Under the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 86 Colum. L. Rev. 433, 485 (1986) (noting that “the kinds 
of cases that came to typify the new litigation boom . . . were often complex and turned on 
issues of motive and intent”); see also Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common 
Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. Pa. L. Rev. 909, 
989 (1987) (noting that civil cases have become increasingly expensive and thus rendered 
trials largely obsolete). 
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seems less sound.69 While the vagueness of the transactional standard 
still probably encourages litigants to err on the side of including more 
claims, lest preclusion extinguish those claims, such litigant behavior 
probably is no longer desirable. Consequently, even though litigants and 
the judicial system might recognize that a less inclusive lawsuit might be 
ideal, preclusion still impels litigants to lard their lawsuits with extrane-
ous claims. In this way, the ambiguity inherent in the transactional ap-
proach no longer creates a desirable incentive structure but, instead, 
yields acute unpredictability and inefficiency. 
Scholars and courts have begun to recognize that the transactional ap-
proach to structuring lawsuits leads to unwieldiness.70 Although courts 
rarely speak directly to the issue, they use various tools at their disposal 
to alleviate what they perceive as a genuine problem. One such tool is to 
give “transaction or occurrence” a narrow definition, even when various 
claims almost undeniably relate to the same underlying facts. For in-
stance, one court candidly noted that it construed the “transaction or oc-
currence” test of Federal Rule 13(a) narrowly in order to exclude from 
the litigation a counterclaim that would “unnecessarily complicate” the 
lawsuit.71 Similarly, some courts have attempted to restrict the scope of a 
“transaction or occurrence” in order to avoid confusing the trier of fact.72 
In one case that already involved numerous claims and cross-claims al-
leging violations of federal securities laws (as well as common-law neg-
ligence, fraud, and deceit), the trial and appellate courts clearly worried 
that additional counterclaims might turn the lawsuit into an unwieldy 
mess. In that case, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit ad-
mitted that the counterclaims were factually related to the original 
 
69 Some scholars are right to point out that the received wisdom on the growing complexi-
ty of civil cases might be overstated. (I am especially grateful to Professor Dave Marcus for 
this insight.) Professor Clark recognized in the early twentieth century that even then cases 
were growing more complex. See Subrin, supra note 68, at 965–66. Presumably he believed 
that the new Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which he helped draft, were up to the task of 
handling such complexity. 
70 See Effron, supra note 20, at 776–83, 790–94 (describing how judges attempt to restrict 
the size of lawsuits that inefficiently encompass too many claims under the “transaction or 
occurrence” standard). 
71 Agliam v. Ohio Sav. Ass’n, 99 F.R.D. 145, 148 (N.D. Ohio 1983) (holding that a state-
law counterclaim for unpaid balance on a mortgage note was not part of the same transaction 
or occurrence as the facts underlying the Truth in Lending Act claim).  
72 See, e.g., Roberts Metals, Inc. v. Fla. Props. Mktg. Grp., 138 F.R.D. 89, 91 (N.D. Ohio 
1991) (finding two claims derived from distinct transactions in order to avoid confusing the 
trier of fact); see also Conway, supra note 48, at 161. 
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claim.73 Yet in holding that the counterclaims were not part of the same 
underlying transaction or occurrence, the court focused on problems of 
managing such a complicated lawsuit, including the novelty of certain 
legal claims and differing burdens of proof that could confuse a trier of 
fact.74 The ubiquity of these attempts to restrict the scope of transactions 
and occurrences suggests that the transactional approach indeed has led 
to overly broad lawsuits. 
The inefficient breadth of lawsuits is only part of the problem. As ear-
ly scholars noted, a judge always can order separate trials of various 
claims.75 Today, though, the overwhelming majority of claims do not ac-
tually go to trial. Many, if not most, ripe claims will remain unpleaded,76 
and only a tiny fraction of pleaded claims will make it all the way to a 
trial.77 In these respects, there is a glaring disparity between transaction-
alism’s goal of facilitating efficient trials and the modern reality that tri-
als have become largely obsolete. 
Like many procedural reforms in the early twentieth century, the 
transactional approach to litigation aspired to abrogate procedural traps 
and help resolve a dispute’s underlying merits.78 Indeed, advocates tout-
ed transactionalism’s power to promote the “convenience of trial.”79 In 
the first half of the twentieth century, the assumption that procedural 
rules should structure lawsuits with an eye toward resolving the parties’ 
 
73 See Federman v. Empire Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 597 F.2d 798, 812 (2d Cir. 1979). 
74 See id. 
75 See Blume, supra note 11, at 58; Blume, Scope of a Civil Action, supra note 66, at 268; 
Wright, supra note 18, at 443; see also, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(b) (authority to order separate 
trials). 
76 See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., An Examination Before and Behind the “Entire Controver-
sy” Doctrine, 28 Rutgers L.J. 7, 7 (1996) (noting that “[m]ost legal controversies, whether 
primary or secondary, will settle if the courts will leave them alone” and that courts cannot 
predict at the outset “whether the secondary and contingent controversies will mature into 
actual legal disputes”). 
77 See Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, 2012 Annual Report of the Director on Judicial 
Business of the United States Courts tbl.C-4 (2012) (showing that 1.2% of civil cases filed in 
federal court went to trial); Marc Galanter, The Hundred-Year Decline of Trials and the 
Thirty Years War, 57 Stan. L. Rev. 1255, 1255–59 (2005) (noting a steady decline in the 
percentage of trials in federal and state courts); see also Kevin M. Clermont, Litigation Real-
ities Redux, 84 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1919, 1956 n.184 (2009) (noting that approximately 1% 
of federal civil cases terminate with trial); Glover, supra note 68, at 1720 (noting that “feder-
al civil trials . . . are now a rarity”).  
78 See, e.g., Subrin, supra note 68, at 962; Jay Tidmarsh, Pound’s Century, and Ours, 81 
Notre Dame L. Rev. 513, 515, 571 (2006). 
79 See Charles E. Clark, The Code Cause of Action, 33 Yale L.J. 817, 817–18 (1924); see 
also Bone, supra note 10, at 85. 
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disputes at trial appeared reasonable,80 but today that is hardly the case. 
Most lawsuits are destined to end well before trial, often through dismis-
sals and settlements.81 
The fact that hardly any cases actually culminate with a trial means 
that the supposed antidote to bloated lawsuits—the power to order sepa-
rate trials—virtually disappears.82 In an era in which most claims do not 
make it all the way to trial, that tool does almost nothing to ameliorate 
the concern that lawsuits have grown to include too many claims. The 
problem is no longer that a trial might become unmanageable. Instead, 
the modern concern is that unduly large lawsuits will unnecessarily con-
sume time and expense during the pretrial phase (for instance, through 
discovery and motions practice). The ability to sever claims on the eve 
of trial cannot allay those problems. 
*** 
In short, fundamental assumptions on which transactionalism origi-
nally rested have become antiquated and now conspire to undermine 
clarity and efficiency. The inherent ambiguity as to the contours of a 
transaction or occurrence likely leads parties to include any claims that 
are at the margins of that transaction. Unlike in bygone generations, 
there are good reasons to believe that tendency now leads to inefficiently 
large lawsuits that traditional tools of trial management are impotent to 
combat. Ambiguity that once was benign (or perhaps even beneficial) 
has come into starker relief and now leads to conspicuous inefficiencies. 
 
80 See Stephen C. Yeazell, The Misunderstood Consequences of Modern Civil Process, 
1994 Wis. L. Rev. 631, 636 (noting that “[i]n 1938, 63% of the adjudicated terminations of 
civil cases were trials and directed verdicts”). In some sense trials were always the exception 
rather than the rule. See Subrin, supra note 68, at 989. But in the early twentieth century, tri-
als and contested hearings still accounted for 25–30% of dispositions. Galanter, supra note 
77, at 1257. As Professor Subrin has observed, even if facilitating settlements is among the 
goals of a modern procedural regime, bargaining must be in the shadow of the law. If trials 
are not feasible, though, “bargaining is in the shadow of a shadow.” Subrin, supra note 68, at 
989. 
81 See Glover, supra note 68, at 1720–24. 
82 Professor Clark believed that streamlined procedure should aid in the disposition of the 
“large amount of ordinary litigation, the greater part of which does not go to trial.” Charles 
E. Clark & James Wm. Moore, A New Federal Civil Procedure: Pleadings and Parties (pt. 
2), 44 Yale L.J. 1291, 1294 (1935). But he clearly regarded unwieldy lawsuits as “a trial 
problem,” the solution to which was a court’s power to “order separate trials.” Id. at 1320; 
cf. id. at 1321 (distinguishing between the power to sever and the power to order separate 
trials). 
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3. Imperfect Predictions. Even in an era in which transactionalism 
was more likely to produce greater efficiency, it still represented, at best, 
a crude ex ante prediction of the ideal structure of litigation. There was 
always the potential that the ideal lawsuit might be narrower or broader 
in scope than a “transaction or occurrence.” In the last generation or so, 
as the dynamics described above have played out, transactionalism has 
led to increasingly cumbersome lawsuits. 
Scholars have recognized that in a world of more complicated law-
suits, the transactional approach often impels parties to include too many 
claims in a single lawsuit.83 The world of contract law illustrates the un-
wieldiness that has ensued. In the first half of the twentieth century, a 
typical contract lawsuit involved a dispute between two private parties.84 
With an uncomplicated party structure and a discrete universe of claims, 
a lawsuit that grouped together all of the claims that arose from a con-
tract was probably the most efficient way to resolve the parties’ dispute. 
Today, though, treating a contract as a transaction or occurrence—and 
requiring the parties to litigate all claims arising from that contract—
does not obviously lead to the most efficient resolution of a controversy. 
The distribution agreement between Starbucks and Kraft is a recent ex-
ample of a complicated, far-reaching contract between large corporate 
entities that gave rise to myriad potential claims. Arguably the most sig-
nificant claim, and the only one that independently would have led to lit-
igation, was the question of the contract’s duration, which was uncertain 
based on convoluted language. By some estimates, it was nearly a three 
billion dollar question.85 Under certain circumstances, the most efficient 
 
83 See Freer, Avoiding Duplicative Litigation, supra note 10, at 814 (noting that compulso-
ry joinder rules might force “litigation of claims which otherwise might not have been as-
serted” and make “pleadings, motions, discovery, and trial more complicated simply by in-
jecting more claims, defenses, and parties”); see also Effron, supra note 20, at 777 (noting 
how judges manipulate the “transaction or occurrence” standard “to mask deeper policy dif-
ferences about how cases should be litigated”); Conway, supra note 48, at 160–61 (arguing 
that “a broad rule of compulsory counterclaims may remove some of the trial judge’s discre-
tion to effectively structure litigation” and that a broad joinder rule can lead to the inclusion 
of too many claims that will confuse a jury). 
84 See Resnik, supra note 67, at 508. 
85 See Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Preliminary Injunction at 6–7, 
15, Kraft Foods Global, Inc. v. Starbucks Corp., No. 10 CV 09085 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 23, 2010); see 
also Starbucks Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 17–18 (Nov. 16, 2012), 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/829224/000082922412000007/sbux-9302012x10k.htm 
(noting that at arbitration Starbucks sought only nominal damages for Kraft’s alleged 
breaches). 
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way to resolve that question would have been a narrow lawsuit or arbi-
tration focused solely on the contract’s duration.86 But the transactional 
approach essentially forced the parties to plead every claim that arose 
from the contract, lest preclusion extinguish those claims, even if the 
parties did not necessarily have a desire to litigate anything beyond the 
question of the contract’s duration. The distribution agreement thus is a 
typical example of a contract dispute that has become so complicated 
that a lawsuit that encompasses all claims arising from the contract 
threatens to become unmanageable. 
Occasionally courts expressly recognize that the transactional ap-
proach can create unmanageable lawsuits and that they have only blunt, 
imperfect tools to deal with such problems. For example, in William 
Blanchard Co. v. Beach Concrete Co., construction of a large building 
had taken significantly longer than anticipated, and assigning responsi-
bility among various contractors and subcontractors had led to protract-
ed and convoluted litigation.87 For strategic reasons, the plaintiff had 
withheld certain claims and, in effect, impeded settlement between the 
other parties.88 Despite such gamesmanship, applicable doctrine proba-
bly allowed the plaintiff to amend its complaint and include the omitted 
claims, particularly because the trial judge had determined that those 
claims were part of the relevant transaction or occurrence.89 The prob-
lems were thus twofold. Not only had the plaintiff engaged in irksome 
(albeit permissible) gamesmanship, but the belated inclusion of certain 
claims threatened to create an unwieldy lawsuit.90 The courts fairly can-
didly admitted that they were manipulating preclusion doctrine in order 
to deal with both problems and prevent the plaintiff from including the 
new claims.91 In other words, lawsuits can become convoluted, and—
contrary to the expectations of transactionalism’s early advocates—
courts lack the flexibility to create efficient litigation units. 
 
86 In some ways I have simplified the facts for purposes of illustration. Although the ques-
tion of the contract’s duration was theoretically independent of the other claims, one of Star-
bucks’s theories was that Kraft had materially breached the contract in certain respects, such 
that Starbucks was entitled to terminate the agreement immediately. 
87 375 A.2d 675 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1977). 
88 See id. at 684. 
89 See id. at 684–86. 
90 See id. at 686. 
91 See id. (noting that claim preclusion does not normally operate to bar a claim during the 
initial litigation and that plaintiff ordinarily is permitted to amend pleadings and state a 
transactionally related claim, but affirming trial court’s decision to bar such claims in light of 
plaintiff’s inefficient strategic behavior). 
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Although transactionalism will most likely lead to the inclusion of too 
many claims, such that lawsuits unsurprisingly become unnecessarily 
cumbersome, the transactional approach might lead to the structuring of 
unduly narrow lawsuits. The prototypical car accident case or personal 
contract case no longer dominates the landscape of civil litigation, but 
those cases still arise. 
For instance, imagine the scenario in which Hatfield and McCoy are 
two feuding neighbors who have a series of disputes that under modern 
doctrine probably count as discrete transactions or occurrences. For in-
stance, they might have a minor contractual dispute, a fender bender 
might occur a year later, and then a year after that a nuisance dispute 
might arise (say, because of tree roots encroaching across the property 
line). Litigating those claims together probably would capture many ef-
ficiencies—drawing upon the resources of a court only once and gather-
ing evidence that might be very similar across the claims (for example, 
the testimony of other neighbors who witnessed all of the relevant 
events). Indeed, such situations may have been precisely what certain 
scholars had in mind when they suggested that the law should move to-
ward encouraging parties to litigate all of their claims against one anoth-
er in a single proceeding.92 For the reasons that I have discussed above, 
the “more is better” approach no longer represents the most efficient 
way to resolve most disputes. But sometimes it might. In those situa-
tions, the transactional approach—and its prediction about the appropri-
ate lawsuit structure—is underinclusive. 
*** 
In recent years, the tension between flexibility and predictability in-
herent in the transactional approach has led to conspicuous inefficiency. 
No longer do the incentives align for parties to create the optimal litiga-
tion structure for their lawsuits. In the mine run of modern cases, parties 
have an incentive to take a kitchen-sink tack, pleading every claim that 
even conceivably falls within the transaction or occurrence that is at the 
heart of a lawsuit, even when doing so leads to pervasive inefficiencies 
that courts are hard-pressed to mitigate. Moreover, transactionalism can 
also generate lawsuits that are inefficiently narrow in scope when a law-
suit presents discrete issues that lend themselves to resolution in a single 
lawsuit but nominally derive from distinct transactions. 
 
92 See supra note 65 and accompanying text. 
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B. The Failure of Transactionalism to Govern Preclusion Effectively 
The other group of pathologies concerns the uncomfortable role that 
transactionalism plays in governing preclusion doctrine. As discussed 
above, although transactionalism aspires to create maximal flexibility in 
structuring lawsuits on the front end of litigation, the harsh effects of 
claim preclusion on the back end of litigation require predictability. But 
the rigidity of preclusion, when mixed with the malleable transactional 
standard, undercuts such predictability and thus can lead to basic unfair-
ness. Moreover, rigidity compromises party autonomy in structuring 
lawsuits. 
On the assumption that most lawsuits should not encompass every 
possible claim that the parties might assert against one another, the par-
ties have an interest in figuring out exactly which claims they do and do 
not have to bring. In other words, they have an interest in being able to 
predict exactly how preclusion will apply to their claims. 
1. The Basic Unpredictability of Preclusion Under Transactionalism. 
The transactional approach, by dint of its emphasis on flexibility, is not 
particularly well suited to the task of providing clarity about the scope of 
preclusion.93 Moreover, there is no formal mechanism by which the par-
ties can get clarity during the initial litigation about which claims the 
court considers to be part of the same transaction or occurrence.94 Usual-
ly the parties will find out once it’s too late. Only during a subsequent 
proceeding, when a party attempts to bring a claim, will it learn conclu-
sively what the transaction or occurrence from the earlier lawsuit cov-
ered.95 
 
93 See, e.g., Clark, supra note 11, at 144; see also Kane, supra note 25, at 1735 (noting the 
conflict among policies of fostering judicial economy, repose, and resolving cases on the 
merits). 
94 One exception to this is in federal court when a defendant pleads a counterclaim that is 
not supported by an independent ground of subject matter jurisdiction and, therefore, re-
quires supplemental jurisdiction. Some courts construe the scope of compulsory counter-
claims and supplemental jurisdiction to be identical. See infra note 130 and accompanying 
text. Consequently, the court’s ruling on the jurisdictional question effectively advises the 
defendant about the reach of preclusion. But some courts decouple the standards governing 
those two inquiries. See Jones v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 358 F.3d 205, 213 (2d Cir. 2004) 
(construing the supplemental jurisdiction statute to be broader than the scope of the compul-
sory counterclaim rule). 
95 Some courts and scholars have suggested that courts should be able to establish the 
bounds of preclusion that apply to the litigation at hand and that that determination should 
bind courts in subsequent litigation. See, e.g., 18 Wright et al., supra note 43, § 4413; Tobias 
B. Wolff, Preclusion in Class Action Litigation, 105 Colum. L. Rev. 717, 770–76 (2005). 
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As a result of the need for certainty, the notion of a transaction or oc-
currence has ossified somewhat. In a number of situations, the case law 
“permit[s] generalization about the dimensions of [claim preclusion] un-
der the transactional view.”96 One of the easiest situations involves the 
hypothetical car accident between Hatfield and McCoy: The plaintiff 
suffered personal injuries and property damage in one accident. The 
overwhelming majority of jurisdictions treat that event as a single trans-
action, thus obliging the plaintiff (and the defendant) to bring all of the 
claims that derive from the accident.97 But the inherent flexibility of 
transactionalism still leaves many situations in which certainty is elu-
sive. For instance, if a contract or negotiable instrument calls for in-
stallment payments, does each breach constitute a separate claim or are 
all of the breaches part of the same transaction or occurrence? The an-
swer varies, often turning on “[p]arties’ expectations and business un-
derstandings,” reflecting the “functional flexibility of the transactional 
view.”98 In short, transactionalism has lost a degree of flexibility, which 
contributes to the inefficiencies described in the previous section, but 
neither does it provide the certainty that parties need, for purposes of 
preclusion, as they structure lawsuits. 
2. The Rigidity of Preclusion. Contributing to the uncertainty is the ri-
gidity of claim preclusion. By this I mean that the parties have little to 
no ability to control the preclusive consequences of their litigation. For 
the reasons discussed above, the parties usually cannot know the precise 
contours of a transaction or occurrence at the beginning of a lawsuit. 
The bounds of the transaction or occurrence become clear only at a 
much later time—during a subsequent lawsuit—but at that point preclu-
sion applies rigidly. 
 
One of the leading federal courts treatises describes a mechanism by which some courts have 
effectively allowed claim splitting—specifically based on Federal Rule 41’s voluntary dis-
missal provision—but acknowledges that very few courts have attempted such a course. See 
18 Wright et al., supra note 43, § 4413. Moreover, there appears to be no authority for a 
court’s attempt to expand the scope of claim preclusion. 
96 Casad & Clermont, supra note 7, at 69. 
97 See id. at 73. The same tends to be true when a defendant has committed multiple acts 
of negligence that result in a single harm (say, if a defendant improperly maintained his 
brakes and also followed another car too closely, both of which contributed to an accident). 
See id. at 74. 
98 See id. at 71. To take another example, suppose that a plaintiff sues a defendant for a 
continuing nuisance and seeks only damages for past harm. Does claim preclusion prevent 
the plaintiff from later seeking an injunction, which she could have brought in the first law-
suit, to abate the nuisance? Transactionalism does not admit of an easy answer. See id. at 77. 
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While courts do have some measure of flexibility in defining the 
boundaries of a transaction or occurrence, the parties generally enjoy no 
such power. Moreover, preclusion attaches to claims that fall within the 
transaction; the doctrine, at least in theory, maps the transaction perfect-
ly and can apply neither more broadly nor more narrowly.99 
Some of the more instructive examples of the doctrine’s rigidity come 
from the compulsory counterclaim context. In one case, a court essen-
tially noted that the compulsory counterclaim rule does not admit of eq-
uitable exceptions, even when the defendant faces a veritable Catch-22. 
United States v. Intrados/International Management Group involved a 
False Claims Act claim by the United States and a breach-of-contract 
counterclaim by the defendant.100 Although the counterclaim was com-
pulsory, the court had to dismiss it without prejudice because the de-
fendant had failed to exhaust its administrative remedies, as required by 
statute.101 The court noted a disturbing possibility: It might resolve the 
United States’ underlying claim before the defendant even had an oppor-
tunity to refile the counterclaim. In that scenario, the compulsory coun-
terclaim rule still might extinguish the defendant’s claim, despite the 
fact that the defendant found itself in a procedural quagmire not of its 
own making.102 
Other cases have highlighted another aspect of the doctrine’s rigidity, 
specifically the parties’ inability to shape the scope of preclusion. In a 
case decided under Kansas law, for example, a defendant sought a vol-
untary dismissal of a counterclaim, and the plaintiff even agreed that the 
dismissal was without prejudice.103 A federal court applying Kansas’s 
compulsory counterclaim rule noted the rule’s inflexibility. 
 
99 See Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 24(1) (1982) (stating that claim preclusion 
applies to rights and remedies “with respect to all or any part of the transaction, or series of 
connected transactions, out of which the action arose”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 13(a) (defining com-
pulsory counterclaim as one that “arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the sub-
ject matter of the opposing party’s claim”); Wright, supra note 18, at 456 (arguing that the 
scope of plaintiffs’ and defendants’ compulsion under the doctrines is the same, extending to 
the same transactionally related operative facts). 
100 277 F. Supp. 2d 55, 56–57 (D.D.C. 2003). 
101 See id. at 63–66 (noting the defendant’s failure to comply with the administrative ex-
haustion requirement of the Contract Disputes Act). 
102 See id. at 66 (noting the inflexibility of the compulsory counterclaim rule). In light of 
this possibility, the court proposed a limited stay of the judicial proceeding in order to allow 
the defendant an opportunity to exhaust its administrative remedies. See id. 
103 See Am. Plastic Equip., Inc. v. Toytrackerz, LLC, No. C.A. 07-2253-DJW, 2008 WL 
917635, at *3–4 (D. Kan. Mar. 31, 2008). 
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[W]hen a party files a compulsory counterclaim in an action in Kansas 
state court, that party must maintain that claim or be barred from later 
bringing another action on that claim. The fact that the counter-
claimaint dismisses the counterclaim without prejudice[,] and even 
with the other parties’ agreement that the first action will not be bind-
ing in any other actions involving the parties, does not alter the preclu-
sive effect of the dismissal.104 
Courts applying Ohio’s,105 Arkansas’s,106 and Tennessee’s107 compulsory 
counterclaim rules have reached the same result. Other courts, in con-
struing the federal compulsory counterclaim rule, similarly have recog-
nized that parties may not negotiate around the effects of that rule. They 
have done so, however, in more explicit terms, holding that a party has 
no latitude to voluntarily dismiss a compulsory counterclaim without 
prejudice.108 
There are two ways in which the doctrine of claim preclusion might 
not be quite as rigid as I have suggested, but those exceptions do little to 
ameliorate the problems discussed above. First, modern preclusion prin-
 
104 Id. at *7 (citing Bugner v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 18 P.3d 283 (Kan. Ct. App. 
2001)). 
105 See, e.g., Stern v. Whitlatch & Co., 631 N.E.2d 680, 682 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993) (holding 
that Ohio’s compulsory counterclaim rule prevented a party from refiling a counterclaim that 
it had raised and voluntarily dismissed in an earlier lawsuit); McConnell v. Applied Perfor-
mance Techs., Inc., No. C2-01-1273, 2002 WL 32882707, at *9 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 11, 2002) 
(same); see also Pitcher v. Waldman, No. 1:12-CV-215, 2013 WL 632368, at *6 (S.D. Ohio 
Feb. 20, 2013) (treating Ohio’s compulsory counterclaim rule as instructive in interpreting 
Federal Rule 13(a)). 
106 See Edwards v. Ark. Power & Light Co., 683 F.2d 1149, 1155 (8th Cir. 1982) (citing 
Shrieves v. Yarbrough, 247 S.W.2d 193, 194 (Ark. 1952)) (holding that a party may not 
maintain a later lawsuit on a compulsory counterclaim that the party had dismissed without 
prejudice in an earlier lawsuit). But see Green Mach. Corp. v. Allen Eng’g Corp., 145 
F. Supp. 2d 636, 643–44 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (construing Arkansas rules to permit a voluntary 
dismissal without prejudice of a counterclaim). 
107 See, e.g., Clements v. Austin, 673 S.W.2d 867, 868–70 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983); see also 
Carnation Co. v. T.U. Parks Constr. Co., 816 F.2d 1099, 1104 (6th Cir. 1987) (recognizing 
Tennessee’s rule). 
108 See, e.g., Steele v. Bell, No. 11 CIV 9343 RA, 2012 WL 6641491, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. 
Dec. 19, 2012) (“Compulsory counterclaims, however, cannot be withdrawn without preju-
dice.”); Shaw Family Archives, Ltd. v. CMG Worldwide, Inc., No. 05 CV 3939 (CM), 2008 
WL 4127549, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 2, 2008) (same); Pizzulli v. Nw. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 
No. 05 CIV 1889 (LAP), 2006 WL 490097, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2006) (same); see also 
Kissell Co. v. Farley, 417 F.2d 1180, 1182–83 (7th Cir. 1969) (noting that when a defendant 
moves to dismiss a compulsory counterclaim, the court should dismiss it with, rather than 
without, prejudice). 
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ciples at least theoretically allow parties and courts to depart from the 
general rule against “claim splitting” and litigate less than the full trans-
action.109 Courts often note that parties may agree expressly to litigate 
only one aspect of a transaction, but “most of the statements occur in de-
cisions that find no such agreement.”110 Similarly, although courts may 
permit claim splitting, special circumstances usually must be present. 
For instance, a party might discover a transactionally related claim on 
the eve of trial, or a court might have erroneously dismissed a transac-
tionally related claim.111 The infrequency with which courts recognize or 
authorize claim splitting suggests that such practices are anomalous and 
that there is still a strong presumption of applying preclusion to the en-
tire transaction. Moreover, the potential flexibility suggested by the Re-
statement (Second) of Judgments and treatises stands in tension with 
much of the jurisprudence. The Supreme Court has endorsed a “rigorous 
application” of claim preclusion that does not admit of equitable excep-
tions.112 And many of the cases just discussed have held that parties and 
courts have no power to negotiate around compulsory counterclaim 
rules, which at least theoretically are more amenable to equitable excep-
tions than the traditional doctrine of claim preclusion.113 
The second way in which courts can mitigate the harsh effects of pre-
clusion is by defining a transaction narrowly. For example, a party who 
should have brought a transactionally related claim during the initial liti-
gation might attempt to bring that claim during a second proceeding. To 
avoid the application of claim preclusion, a judge in the second lawsuit 
simply can find that the new claim, in fact, was outside the scope of the 
first lawsuit’s underlying transaction. Professor Clark recognized, and 
argued against, “this judicial tenderness towards defeated litigants.”114 
But it endures. Professor Douglas McFarland has noted judges’ continu-
ing antipathy toward compulsory counterclaims and, accordingly, a ten-
 
109 See Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 26(1)(a) (1982). 
110 18 Wright et al., supra note 43, § 4415. 
111 See Casad & Clermont, supra note 7, at 101. 
112 Federated Dep’t Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 400 (1981) (citing Reed v. Allen, 
286 U.S. 191 (1932)); cf. id. at 402–03 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment) (arguing 
that the Court should not “close the door” on “equitable tempering” of claim preclusion (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted)). 
113 See Wright, supra note 18, at 429 (arguing that estoppel, Wright’s preferred term to de-
scribe the preclusion that applies to compulsory counterclaims, is “a more flexible tool”); 
Schopflocher, supra note 22, at 364 (arguing for similar flexibility). 
114 See Clark, supra note 11, at 145. 
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dency to describe transactions in unduly narrow terms.115 One judge 
candidly acknowledged that he was doing precisely that—construing a 
“transaction or occurrence” narrowly in order to evade the harsh conse-
quence of the compulsory counterclaim rule.116 When he became a 
judge, Clark pithily captured many judges’ aversion to a broad applica-
tion of preclusion: “The defense of res judicata is universally respected, 
but actually not very well liked.”117 
If claim preclusion has become unduly harsh or broad, the proper re-
sponse hardly should be taking comfort in judges’ power to engage in 
post hoc prestidigitation. Not only does this approach lack candor, it 
fails to create predictability for litigants. A party who might want to wait 
and bring a claim in a later proceeding has no way of knowing whether 
she will be able to rely on “judicial tenderness” during the second law-
suit. Moreover, such an approach compromises the opposing party’s in-
terest in repose. Consequently, even if some exceptions render preclu-
sion slightly less rigid than I have described, those palliatives offer little 
more than cold comfort. 
3. Undermining Fairness and Party Autonomy. Transactionalism’s 
role within a rigid preclusion doctrine thus operates in a way that fails to 
promote basic fairness and also undermines party autonomy. The above 
factors align to create this result. First, the inherent flexibility of the 
transactional approach means that parties cannot reliably predict at the 
start of litigation how broadly preclusion will sweep. Second, the parties 
have little to no opportunity to inquire of the court hearing the initial 
lawsuit whether a particular claim indeed falls within the scope of the 
lawsuit’s underlying transaction or occurrence.118 Finally, despite the 
parties’ inability to make accurate predictions at the beginning of a law-
suit as to how broadly preclusion will apply, they remain largely power-
less to control or abate its harsh consequences on the back end of litiga-
tion. 
 
115 See McFarland, supra note 27, at 715–17. 
116 See Aeroquip Corp. v. Chunn, 526 F. Supp. 1259, 1262 (N.D. Ala. 1981) (“The conse-
quences of finding such a counterclaim compulsory weigh toward a narrow construction of 
the rule in such a case.”). 
117 Riordan v. Ferguson, 147 F.2d 983, 988 (2d Cir. 1945) (Clark, J., dissenting). 
118 One might imagine a less sweeping proposal than mine that simply permits parties to 
make a formal inquiry along these lines and receive an answer from the court. Such an ap-
proach would foster greater predictability, but it would not adequately address many of the 
other pathologies. 
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For these reasons, the parties are subject to losing otherwise viable 
claims through the somewhat surreptitious operation of preclusion. Par-
ticularly in light of the doctrine’s severity, the transactional approach 
can undermine basic notions of fairness. Admittedly, the unfairness is 
not intractable. Parties can mitigate the unforgiving consequences of 
preclusion simply by including any claim that might be at the margins of 
the transaction or occurrence that underlies the lawsuit. The rules of 
joinder usually allow that approach, although the Intrados case demon-
strates how procedural rules still can create obstacles that prevent the 
parties from including certain claims. Moreover, the solution to the un-
fairness problem leads directly to the inefficiencies described in the pre-
vious section—parties will include a bevy of claims and thus construct 
unwieldy lawsuits. 
Finally, the rigidity of preclusion undercuts party autonomy. Alt-
hough any mandatory joinder rule encroaches on a party’s autonomy in 
designing a lawsuit, such incursions usually are justifiable on the ground 
that they are necessary or desirable to protect other values—such as so-
cietal interests in efficiency or an opposing party’s interest in predicta-
bility and repose.119 But preclusion protects those countervailing inter-
ests obliquely or, in some instances, actually undermines them. 
Consequently, although the autonomy costs of a rigid preclusion doc-
trine are clear, the corresponding benefits of such rigidity are not. 
C. The Mutability of Transactions 
In light of transactionalism’s aspiration to create a flexible means of 
structuring lawsuits, it probably comes as no surprise that the definition 
of a transaction or occurrence often defies hard-and-fast definition. The 
ebb and flow of a transaction’s boundaries is far from fatal. In fact, some 
scholars have embraced transactionalism’s versatility in addressing dif-
ferent policy goals.120 My point is simply that transactionalism never has 
represented a unified ideal; consequently, abandoning it in favor of a dif-
ferent approach that fosters greater efficiency and autonomy would not 
upend an inherently useful idea. A few salient examples highlight the 
point. 
 
119 See, e.g., Freer, Avoiding Duplicative Litigation, supra note 10, at 831–37. 
120 See generally Kane, supra note 25 (arguing that the notion of a transaction or occur-
rence appropriately varies in accordance with underlying policies that procedural devices 
seek to effectuate). 
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For purposes of joinder and preclusion, New Jersey defines a transac-
tion much more broadly than any other jurisdiction. Under its civil prac-
tice rules, parties must join together all claims that are part of their “en-
tire controversy,” under penalty of preclusion.121 Since the middle of the 
twentieth century, the “entire controversy” doctrine has evolved and de-
fined the parties’ controversy in transactional terms,122 but it has includ-
ed far more within that definition than do the Federal Rules or the rules 
of other states.123 Like other jurisdictions’ references to transactions or 
occurrences, New Jersey’s “entire controversy” doctrine seeks to foster 
greater efficiency and judicial economy by resolving related claims to-
gether.124 New Jersey just has a different conception of how broad the 
lawsuit—and thus a “transaction”—should be.125 
One of the areas in which courts most conspicuously struggle to dis-
cern the scope of a transaction or occurrence is the supplemental juris-
diction statute. A federal court usually must have independent subject 
matter jurisdiction over each claim—typically, federal question jurisdic-
tion126 or diversity jurisdiction.127 In some instances, though, a court may 
hear a claim that does not have an independent basis for jurisdiction. 
The current statute extends supplemental jurisdiction to claims that are 
“so related” to claims already before the court that the new claims “form 
 
121 See N.J. Civ. Prac. R. 4:30A (“Non-joinder of claims required to be joined by the entire 
controversy doctrine shall result in the preclusion of the omitted claims to the extent required 
by the entire controversy doctrine . . . .”). 
122 See, e.g., Joel v. Morrocco, 688 A.2d 1036, 1037 (N.J. 1997) (“The doctrine requires 
parties to a controversy before a court to assert all claims known to them that stem from the 
same transactional facts . . . .”). 
123 See Erichson, supra note 61, at 760–61; John A. Boyle, Note, Returning to Its Roots: 
An Examination of the 1998 Amendments to the Entire Controversy Doctrine, 30 Seton Hall 
L. Rev. 310, 349–50 (1999); see also Rycoline Prods., Inc. v. C & W Unlimited, 109 F.3d 
883, 886 (3d Cir. 1997) (“The Entire Controversy Doctrine is essentially New Jersey’s spe-
cific, and idiosyncratic, application of traditional res judicata principles.”).  
124 See Olds v. Donnelly, 696 A.2d 633, 637 (N.J. 1997) (noting that “the entire controver-
sy doctrine seeks to assure that all aspects of a legal dispute occur in a single lawsuit”); Cog-
dell v. Hosp. Ctr., 560 A.2d 1169, 1173 (N.J. 1989) (noting concerns of economy, efficiency, 
and fairness); Boyle, supra note 123, at 326; see also Venuto v. Witco Corp., 117 F.3d 754, 
761 (3d Cir. 1997) (noting concerns of efficiency and fairness). 
125 See, e.g., Opdycke v. Stout, 233 F. App’x 125, 129 n.6 (3d Cir. 2007) (observing that 
“the Entire Controversy Doctrine is broader than traditional res judicata principles”); Para-
mount Aviation Corp. v. Augusta, 178 F.3d 132, 137–46 (3d Cir. 1999) (strongly suggesting 
that entire controversy doctrine would define transaction more expansively, and thus apply 
more broadly, than traditional claim preclusion principles). 
126 See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2012). 
127 See id. § 1332. 
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part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United 
States Constitution.”128 Although the statute does not explicitly refer to 
transactions or occurrences, scholars recognize that “a transactional rela-
tionship” was, and remains, “a prerequisite for determining whether 
supplemental jurisdiction exists.”129 
Some courts have found that a transaction, for purposes of supple-
mental jurisdiction, is exactly the same as the transactional requirement 
of Federal Rule 13(a) that governs compulsory counterclaims.130 In con-
trast, other courts have rejected the idea that “transaction” has the same 
meaning in both contexts. Instead, those courts have interpreted the 
transactional requirement more broadly in the jurisdictional context. As 
a result, two particular claims can be part of the same transaction for ju-
risdictional purposes but derive from different transactions for purposes 
of Federal Rule 13.131 
The definition of a “transaction or occurrence” varies across other 
procedures as well. It governs whether certain amendments “relate back” 
to earlier pleadings and thus can avoid potential statute-of-limitations 
problems.132 In that context, courts often interpret the scope of a transac-
 
128 Id. § 1367(a). Before passage of the supplemental jurisdiction statute, the Supreme 
Court, in explicating the same basic idea, said that courts had jurisdiction over all of the 
claims that derive from a “common nucleus of operative fact.” United Mine Workers v. 
Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966). 
129 Kane, supra note 25, at 1732; see also Richard A. Matasar, Rediscovering “One Consti-
tutional Case”: Procedural Rules and the Rejection of the Gibbs Test for Supplemental Juris-
diction, 71 Calif. L. Rev. 1399, 1453–54 (1983) (noting that supplemental jurisdiction, even 
before its codification, was rooted in transactionalism). 
130 See, e.g., Iglesias v. Mut. Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 156 F.3d 237, 241 (1st Cir. 1998) (not-
ing that “[f]ederal courts have [supplemental] jurisdiction over compulsory counterclaims,” 
but “[p]ermissive counterclaims . . . do not fall within [supplemental] jurisdiction”); Unique 
Concepts, Inc. v. Manuel, 930 F.2d 573, 574 (7th Cir. 1991) (“A federal court has supple-
mental jurisdiction over compulsory counterclaims . . . . Permissive counterclaims, however, 
require their own jurisdictional basis.”); Painter v. Harvey, 863 F.2d 329, 331 (4th Cir. 1988) 
(same); see also Oak Park Trust & Sav. Bank v. Therkildsen, 209 F.3d 648, 651 (7th Cir. 
2000) (holding that “a permissive counterclaim . . . is outside the supplemental jurisdic-
tion”); 6 Wright et al., supra note 43, § 1422 (describing this approach); Kane, supra note 25, 
at 1732 n.44 (same). 
131 See, e.g., Jones v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 358 F.3d 205, 209–10, 213–14 (2d Cir. 
2004); see also Channell v. Citicorp Nat’l Servs., 89 F.3d 379, 384–87 (7th Cir. 1996) (rec-
ognizing that the jurisdictional test might be more indulgent); Walker v. THI of N.M. at 
Hobbs Ctr., 803 F. Supp. 2d 1287, 1297–1301 (D.N.M. 2011) (same); 13D Wright et al., su-
pra note 43, § 3567.1 (describing this approach). 
132 A new claim that derives from a lawsuit’s original transaction or occurrence can relate 
back to the original pleading for purposes of the statute of limitations. See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 15(c). This is useful when the statute of limitations has expired on the new claim some-
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tion in light of the notice-giving function that transactionalism serves.133 
Moreover, a transaction can acquire a different meaning in the contexts 
of claim preclusion134 and party joinder.135 Professor Mary Kay Kane has 
argued that such variation is sensible to the extent that the transactional 
test seeks to effectuate the differing policy goals that underlie those re-
spective procedural devices.136 
Although scholars have differed as to whether a transaction or occur-
rence should have a consistent meaning across different procedural 
rules,137 the bigger problem is inconsistency within each rule.138 No one 
argues that the latter inconsistency is advisable or justifiable. It is, how-
ever, a natural consequence of transactionalism’s futile attempt to solve 
too many problems. Professor Robin Effron has argued that the dilemma 
stems from an inadequate fit between the text of the rules, including 
their reliance on transactional relatedness, and the underlying purpose of 
the rules.139 As judges attempt to ameliorate that mismatch, they wind up 
creating inconsistencies “within each rule, across the rules with similar 
texts, or among the circuits interpreting the rules.”140 
The upshot is that transactions or occurrences are malleable, and 
courts have struggled for decades to explicate what counts as a transac-
tion or occurrence for purposes of any given rule. Consequently, transac-
tions or occurrences do not capture an inherently useful legal idea. Per-
haps more insidiously, transactionalism obfuscates the real policies at 
work in many procedural rules and inhibits courts’ ability to effectuate 
those policies. 
 
time between the filing of the original complaint and the filing of the amendment that seeks 
to add the new claim. 
133 See Kane, supra note 25, at 1738–39, 1741. 
134 See id. at 1733–35. 
135 See id. at 1746; Effron, supra note 20, at 770–73. 
136 See Kane, supra note 25, at 1726. 
137 Compare id. at 1723–24, 1726 (arguing that “transaction or occurrence” does and 
should vary in accordance with the underlying purpose of each rule), with McFarland, supra 
note 26, at 301–04 (arguing that “transaction or occurrence” should have a consistent inter-
pretation across various rules). 
138 See Effron, supra note 20, at 762. 
139 See id. at 763. 
140 Id. at 762. 
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III. A PROPOSAL FOR RESTRUCTURING LAWSUITS 
In this Part, I propose a method for restructuring the rules of claim 
joinder and preclusion into a system that actually achieves the goals that 
transactionalism imperfectly pursues. First, it will create true flexibility 
in structuring lawsuits, giving courts and parties the ability to determine 
the appropriate scope of any given lawsuit. No longer will they have to 
rely on transactionalism’s rough ex ante predictions. Second, it will em-
power litigants for the first time to control the preclusive consequences 
of their litigation. In the process, it also will clarify the scope of preclu-
sion that will attach to any given lawsuit. Parties will know at the outset 
of litigation which claims a lawsuit encompasses, whereas the current 
regime provides clarity on that point only once it is too late—when a 
party attempts to bring a claim in a subsequent lawsuit. 
A. The Mechanics of Restructuring Joinder and Claim Preclusion 
1. The Basic Model. The proposal begins with an idea that is nearly 
one hundred years old—a requirement that at the initiation of litigation 
the parties should join all of the claims that they have against one anoth-
er.141 The mandatory joinder requirement that I envision, though, is not 
an end in itself. It is purely instrumental. Unlike early twentieth-century 
scholars, I do not suggest that the typical lawsuit should comprise all of 
the claims that the parties might have against one another,142 nor do I as-
sume that the parties eventually will pursue all of those claims in court. 
The point of a mandatory joinder rule is simply to encourage the parties 
to put all of the claims on the table for purposes of negotiating the scope 
of the lawsuit. At present, claim joinder rules are merely permissive with 
respect to claims that extend beyond the transaction or occurrence.143 As 
a result, one party exercises sole control over whether its non-
transactionally related claims will be part of the lawsuit. The proposed 
claim joinder rule takes away that unilateral veto. Unlike current manda-
 
141 Clark, supra note 11, at 145–46; Blume, supra note 11, at 58–60. Professor Clark rec-
ognized that such a requirement was unlikely to come to fruition given the “long strug-
gle . . . to obtain support for even the rules of permissive joinder.” Clark, supra note 11, at 
145. 
142 See, e.g., Wright, supra note 18, at 443 (noting courts’ power to order separate trials); 
Blume, supra note 11, at 58 (same). 
143 See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 13(b) (permissive counterclaim), 18(a) (claim joinder); Re-
statement (Second) of Judgments § 24(1) (1982) (restricting preclusion to transactionally 
related claims). 
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tory joinder rules, my proposal does not insist that the parties actually 
litigate all of those claims. But the compulsion would mean that if a par-
ty fails to plead any ripe claim, the penalty will be a bar against asserting 
that claim in any subsequent lawsuits. 
The next step involves a negotiation to discern the scope of the law-
suit. That negotiation will take place within the pretrial structures that 
already exist under the Federal Rules and analogous rules in most states. 
Under Federal Rule 26(f), the parties already must meet to discuss mat-
ters such as the potential for settlement and the parameters of discov-
ery.144 At that conference, the parties will discuss which claims they be-
lieve most sensibly belong together in one litigation package. The 
parties already must submit a report detailing the results of this confer-
ence,145 and that report now will include the results of the negotiation re-
garding what they believe is the appropriate scope of the lawsuit. As 
with the remainder of the report, the parties’ recommendations are not 
conclusive and ultimately must receive the imprimatur of the court. 
At a pretrial conference, the judge ultimately will decide which 
claims belong in the litigation package. If the parties agree whether to 
include a particular claim in (or exclude it from) the litigation, a strong 
presumption will attach to that agreement, and a judge should override 
the agreement only when she clearly believes that judicial economy de-
mands a different result. If the parties do not agree whether a specific 
claim should be part of the litigation, then the judge will decide whether 
to include or exclude that claim. For reasons discussed more fully be-
low, the parties probably will not be able to reach complete agreement, 
at least not with respect to every claim. But the judge will have the bene-
fit of knowing all possible claims that could form part of the litigation 
unit and thus will be in a position to make an informed determination 
about the appropriate lawsuit structure. In deciding which claims to in-
clude and exclude, the judge should primarily consider the interests of 
judicial economy, fairness, and any potential prejudice to the actual par-
ties or absent individuals. 
Once the judge has determined which claims to include in the litiga-
tion, the judge will dismiss the excluded claims without prejudice. Pre-
clusion will attach only to the claims that the judge has included in the 
litigation (and, as noted above, to any ripe claims that the parties failed 
 
144 See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(f). 
145 See, e.g., id. 16(b)(1)(A), 26(f)(2). 
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to plead in the first instance). The parties and the courts thus will know 
at the beginning of litigation whether they must resolve any particular 
claim. Even if a party does not prevail during the negotiation and subse-
quent hearing (for example, if a court includes a counterclaim that a de-
fendant would have preferred to litigate separately), that party at the 
very least will know the precise bounds of the lawsuit. Litigants no 
longer will have to guess how a court in a subsequent action will regard 
the scope of their initial lawsuit. 
2. Dealing with Incomplete or Imperfect Information. The basic mod-
el thus far has assumed that the parties know with certainty, at the time 
that litigation commences, exactly which claims they have against one 
another. But that is not always true. A party might have limited infor-
mation or even be completely ignorant of a particular claim that it might 
have against an opposing party. In those instances, existing mechanisms, 
such as tolling provisions, ameliorate such problems. Moreover, the pro-
posed model’s flexibility allows judges to take account of potential di-
lemmas and not unfairly leave parties in the lurch. 
Perhaps the easiest situation involves a claim that accrues after litiga-
tion already has begun. For instance, the plaintiff and defendant might 
wind up in a car accident shortly after the pleadings in a breach-of-
contract action are complete. Although the parties may seek to amend 
the pleadings in order to add the tort claims, such claims were not ripe at 
the time that the litigation began. Consequently, the proposal would not 
require either party to add those claims. 
A slightly more difficult situation arises when a party has a ripe claim 
at the time that litigation commences, but the party does not know about 
the claim. That can happen, for example, when the defendant has taken 
affirmative steps to conceal its illegal activity146 or when a plaintiff has 
been exposed to a product that has a latent defect.147 The claim is theo-
retically ripe, but holding a party responsible for failing to plead such a 
claim in the course of other litigation is not fair and does not promote 
any reasonable notion of efficiency. Most states, though, already have 
means for addressing such conundrums. Very often states toll the appli-
 
146 See Klehr v. A.O. Smith Corp., 521 U.S. 179, 194–96 (1997) (describing “fraudulent 
concealment” doctrine that, in some courts’ formulation, tolls the running of the statute of 
limitations). 
147 See, e.g., Giordano v. Mkt. Am., Inc., 941 N.E.2d 727, 728 (N.Y. 2010) (noting that at 
the time plaintiff suffered strokes, plaintiff and his doctors had no reason to know that plain-
tiff’s exposure to ephedra could have caused strokes). 
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cable statute of limitations for injuries caused by latent defects; the limi-
tations provision does not begin to run until the plaintiff has discovered 
(or with reasonable diligence could have discovered) the injury.148 The 
same is true when a defendant “fraudulent[ly] conceal[s]” its illegal ac-
tivity and thereby prevents a plaintiff from learning that a claim exists.149 
Such an approach seems equally sensible here. Suppose, for example, 
that a plaintiff sues a company for failure to deliver goods on time but 
fails to include a product liability claim that arises from a latent defect in 
the goods. In determining whether the plaintiff should have pleaded the 
product liability claim during the initial litigation, courts should look to 
tolling provisions. If the law of the applicable jurisdiction deems the 
statute of limitations not to be running on the product liability claim 
when the lawsuit commenced, then the party has no obligation to raise 
the claim, which my proposal preserves for future litigation. On the oth-
er hand, if a party actually knows about the product liability claim (or 
reasonably could have discovered it) when the litigation regarding the 
delivery of goods commenced, then the plaintiff has an obligation to 
plead that claim. 
Three other scenarios involving imperfect or incomplete information 
lend themselves to straightforward resolution—primarily because of the 
discretion that judges can exercise to effectuate the spirit of the proposed 
scheme. The key, in all of these situations, is for the party who feels un-
prepared or unable to litigate a claim to plead the claim, even if the party 
does not actually want to litigate it. An easy resolution might follow: 
The parties could agree that the claim does not sensibly belong in the lit-
igation package. Most of the time, that agreement will be dispositive of 
the question. Alternatively, if there is disagreement between the parties, 
the party who believes that one of its claims does not belong in the liti-
gation package should candidly inform the court of the reasons why the 
claim should be dismissed without prejudice. 
In the first scenario, a party might be aware of a potential claim but 
worry that she lacks sufficient factual information to survive a motion to 
dismiss150 under the new “plausibility” pleading standard from Bell At-
 
148 See, e.g., N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214-c(2) (McKinney 2013). 
149 Klehr, 521 U.S. at 194 (holding that “fraudulent concealment” doctrine, in the context 
of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, applies when defendant has tak-
en “‘affirmative steps’ to conceal [its] unlawful activity” and when plaintiff has “exercised 
reasonable diligence”). 
150 See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (motion to dismiss). 
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lantic Corp. v. Twombly151 and Ashcroft v. Iqbal.152 Or, even worse, a 
party might fear that in the absence of more details, pleading such a 
claim might be so frivolous as to be sanctionable under Federal Rule 
11153 and similar state rules. The critical point is that a party should dis-
close those problems to the court. If a party truthfully represents that it 
lacks the knowledge, time, or resources to conduct a thorough investiga-
tion of the claim, those considerations should factor heavily into the 
court’s calculus. It might be necessary, of course, for a court to tease out 
whether such a representation by the party who does not wish to litigate 
its claim is accurate or simply demonstrates malingering. Absent clear 
indications of gamesmanship, though, a party’s acknowledgment of 
those sorts of problems generally should lead a court to accede to the re-
quest and dismiss that claim without prejudice. 
Second, there might be an unfairness if a party is unprepared to go 
forward with a claim that has a significantly longer statute of limitations. 
Imagine that a plaintiff sues a defendant for violations of the Fair Debt 
Collection Practices Act, which has a one-year statute of limitations.154 
The defendant believes that it has counterclaims based on the breach of a 
contract. In every jurisdiction, the statute of limitations for those coun-
terclaims is significantly longer (no shorter than three years155 and up to 
fifteen years156). Thus, my proposal might force a party to plead (and po-
tentially litigate) a claim that the defendant otherwise could wait and lit-
igate at a time and in a forum of its choosing. 
In one sense, forcing the parties to put all of their claims on the table 
might compromise party autonomy by constraining the flexibility that a 
party might have in terms of when and where to bring a claim. But that 
already happens. In the example above, a defendant must assert a con-
tractual counterclaim that a court deems to be part of the same transac-
tion or occurrence as a Fair Debt Collection Practices Act claim. Admit-
tedly, my proposal would go further and require the defendant to plead 
the breach-of-contract claim, irrespective of whether it is transactionally 
 
151 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
152 556 U.S. 662 (2009). 
153 Fed. R. Civ. P. 11. 
154 See 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(d) (2012). 
155 See, e.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, § 8101 (West 2013). 
156 See, e.g., Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 413.090 (West 2001). 
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related to the plaintiff’s original claim.157 The beauty of the proposal, 
though, is that it allows a party to signal to the judge that the party is un-
prepared to litigate a claim. A legitimate reason for not wanting to liti-
gate a contractual counterclaim might be that a defendant has not had 
adequate opportunity to investigate the claim. The defendant can argue 
that it should be allowed to take advantage of the longer statute of limi-
tations in order to undertake such an investigation. Ultimately the deci-
sion will rest with the judge, who must balance concerns of efficiency 
and fairness to a party. Under the present regime, though, a defendant 
does not even have the opportunity to seek a dismissal of a breach-of-
contract counterclaim if a court deems it to be compulsory. Thus, while 
my proposal might give a party less latitude in terms of when and where 
to plead a claim initially, it has the potential to enhance party autonomy 
with respect to when and where the party actually litigates the claim. 
Third, a party might learn that it has a claim only during the course of 
discovery. For example, a plaintiff sues his employer and alleges dis-
crimination in violation of federal statutes; during discovery, the em-
ployer learns information that would support a counterclaim that the 
plaintiff breached his fiduciary duties.158 Unlike the earlier examples in-
volving a latent defect or fraudulent concealment, the counterclaim was 
ripe at the time the plaintiff filed his lawsuit and was not subject to toll-
ing. Theoretically, the defendant could have known about the counter-
claim and included it in its answer. The appropriate solution is for the 
defendant, upon discovering the counterclaim, to seek leave to amend 
the answer and plead the counterclaim.159 As the basic model suggests, if 
the parties agree whether to include or exclude the claim from the litiga-
tion package, the judge will usually honor that agreement.160 If, on the 
other hand, the parties disagree whether the claim belongs in the litiga-
tion package, the judge will resolve the dispute. Part of the decision-
making process should take into account whether the opposing party will 
 
157 See, e.g., Kimmel v. Cavalry Portfolio Servs., 747 F. Supp. 2d 427, 432 (E.D. Pa. 2010) 
(deeming breach-of-contract and unjust enrichment claims to be permissive counterclaims in 
lawsuit originally based on a Fair Debt Collection Practices Act claim). 
158 See Penberg v. Healthbridge Mgmt., No. 08 CV 1534 (SJF), 2010 WL 2787616, at *2–
3 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2010), report and recommendation adopted, No. 08 CV 1534 (SJF) 
(CLP), 2010 WL 2787611 (E.D.N.Y. July 9, 2010). 
159 See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). 
160 If the parties agree to include the claim, then the result is exactly the same as under the 
current rules. See, e.g., id. (noting that “a party may amend its pleading . . . with the oppos-
ing party’s written consent”). 
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experience any prejudice from having to litigate a new claim. But that is 
already part of a court’s determination in whether to allow an amend-
ment.161 To the extent that the new claim is not part of an efficient litiga-
tion package or would lead to prejudice, the court should dismiss that 
claim without prejudice. 
In all instances, the incentive structure reflects the spirit of the pro-
posal. The parties should put forward all of their claims at the earliest 
possible time, forthrightly argue why the court should include the claims 
in (or exclude the claims from) the litigation package, and thereby ena-
ble the court to create the appropriate litigation unit. Provided that the 
parties behave with such candor, they will not forfeit any claims. The 
worst-case scenario is that the court will dismiss certain claims (for in-
stance, ones about which a party lacks sufficient information or ones that 
a party learns about too late during the discovery process) without prej-
udice. 
B. The Advantages of the Proposal 
The proposal finally will accomplish the goals that the transactional 
approach, almost by definition, cannot fully vindicate. As discussed in 
the previous Part, transactionalism simultaneously attempts to serve two 
objectives that often are at cross-purposes: figuring out the efficient 
structure of litigation (which requires a high degree of flexibility) and 
determining the scope of preclusion (which requires a high level of pre-
dictability). The transactional approach has split the difference awk-
wardly and unsatisfyingly. In its place, my proposal will promote true 
efficiency, predictability, and autonomy. 
1. Realizing Efficiency Through Unfettered Flexibility. The negotia-
tion envisioned by the proposal affords parties and judges nearly limit-
less flexibility to determine the appropriate structure of any given law-
suit. A simple lawsuit between two individuals might encompass a 
number of discrete claims that logically belong together, even though 
they derive from what courts today would call distinct transactions or 
occurrences. On the other hand, an efficient lawsuit structure might in-
volve only one facet of a complex contract. 
 
161 See Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962) (noting that courts may deny leave to 
amend under Federal Rule 15(a) for many reasons, including “undue prejudice to the oppos-
ing party”). 
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By eschewing transactionalism’s rough ex ante predictions, the pro-
posal will allow parties and courts to achieve a level of efficiency that 
transactionalism cannot.162 With all possible claims on the table, parties 
and courts will have the ability to discern which ones most logically be-
long together. The results of the parties’ negotiation will reveal not only 
what they regard to be in their collective self-interest but also what the 
socially efficient size of a lawsuit is. 
The ability to capture new efficiencies is most obvious when the par-
ties can agree on the appropriate scope of litigation, regardless of how 
broad or narrow their agreement is. Suppose that the parties agree to a 
lawsuit that is narrower than the transactional approach would require. 
To return to an earlier example, assume that Starbucks and Kraft decide 
to litigate only one aspect of a complex distribution agreement—its du-
ration and renewal provisions. By one estimate, those provisions pre-
sented a nearly three billion dollar question.163 The parties might ration-
ally conclude that they have no immediate interest in litigating other 
aspects of the contract (say, minor breaches that do not have great mone-
tary significance and could distract from the main issue). Under the 
transactional approach to preclusion, the parties would have to include 
all claims deriving from the contract, even if that would be inefficient. 
Instead, by agreeing to a narrower scope of litigation, the parties signal 
to the court what they really want to resolve and what the socially effi-
cient litigation unit is. If the parties represent that they genuinely have 
no intention of turning around and suing each other on the small-bore 
claims, there is no reason for a court to force the parties to litigate those 
claims. Otherwise, the lawsuit would (inefficiently) encompass too 
many claims. At the same time, a party probably does not want to relin-
quish those minor claims altogether in case the claims turn out to be 
more significant than the party initially appreciated. Thus, it is important 
for a court to be able to dismiss those claims without prejudice. 
By contrast, suppose that the plaintiff and defendant agree to litigate a 
plethora of claims that do not logically belong together or capture inher-
ent efficiencies. Such a scenario might present more significant efficien-
 
162 I should reiterate that the current proposal concerns only claim joinder, not party join-
der, even though efficiency eventually must take account of both. Party joinder questions are 
of a different ilk because they raise unique due process considerations, have been the subject 
of an ill-fated experiment in New Jersey, and thus merit more thorough treatment in subse-
quent work.  
163 See supra notes 85–86 and accompanying text. 
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cy concerns, as a lawsuit might threaten to become unwieldy or cause 
juror confusion. But that risk already exists today because of the nearly 
unlimited opportunity for parties to join various claims.164 The primary 
mechanism by which judges currently can deal with this problem is the 
ability to sever the issues and order separate trials.165 Although my pro-
posal preserves that option, it offers two further advantages over the cur-
rent procedural system. First, during the pretrial conference, the judge 
has the ability to confer with the parties and dismiss certain claims with-
out prejudice if there is clear evidence that such a solution would lead to 
more efficient litigation. Second, and perhaps more subtly, if the parties 
have agreed to a large lawsuit during the negotiation that my proposal 
envisions, the parties have sent an important signal to the judge—that 
they genuinely care about litigating the various claims. Under the cur-
rent regime, if the parties have saturated a lawsuit with disparate claims, 
it is much more difficult for a judge to assess whether the parties actual-
ly care about those claims or whether they simply are blustering. By 
contrast, an agreement by the parties to litigate a wide array of claims 
demonstrates a genuine interest in those claims. The judge thus has bet-
ter information as she decides how best to structure the lawsuit and 
whether to dismiss any claims without prejudice. 
The final possible outcome of the negotiation is one in which the par-
ties cannot agree about the appropriate scope of the lawsuit. A cynic, in 
fact, probably would view this as the most likely outcome of the nego-
tiation. Although the negotiation will have been futile on one level, it 
similarly can lead to a socially efficient litigation structure. Even in the 
wake of a failed negotiation, the judge will have full knowledge about 
the potential range of claims. Consequently, the judge will be in a posi-
tion to package together those claims that most lend themselves to reso-
lution in a single proceeding. 
In many ways, the judge who ultimately determines the appropriate 
breadth or narrowness of the lawsuit will rely on many of the useful ana-
lytical tools that courts currently use in defining the contours of a trans-
action or occurrence. For instance, if claims will rely on the same evi-
dence, including the same witnesses, there is a greater likelihood that 
those claims belong together in a single litigation package. The same is 
 
164 See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 13(b) (permissive counterclaims), 18(a) (permissive claim 
joinder). 
165 See, e.g., id. 42(b) (separate trials). 
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true if the claims present overlapping factual or legal issues. But instead 
of considering those factors in order to answer an abstract legal ques-
tion—what counts as a “transaction or occurrence”?—a court will use 
them to address the primary question at the beginning of litigation: 
Which claims most sensibly belong together in the lawsuit? In other 
words, the notion of a transaction has become an unnecessary way sta-
tion en route to determining the appropriate litigation package. Moreo-
ver, the transactional approach to structuring a lawsuit never has attained 
the full measure of flexibility that its proponents envisioned, precisely 
because the same standard governs preclusion questions. The proposal is 
unencumbered by the burdens and limitations of the transactional ap-
proach. Consequently, it creates unfettered flexibility in discerning and 
crafting socially efficient lawsuits. 
2. Fostering Certainty and Predictability. True flexibility on the front 
end of litigation is possible only because the proposal also creates pre-
dictability regarding the exact scope of preclusion. After the negotiation, 
the parties will know that claim preclusion will attach to any claim that 
the judge has included within the lawsuit. But any excluded claims fall 
outside the ambit of the doctrine because the judge will dismiss them 
without prejudice. Again, by abandoning reliance on the abstract con-
cept of a transaction or occurrence, the proposal creates a mechanism 
that enables parties to know at the outset of litigation how broadly pre-
clusion will sweep. No longer will they have to guess during the initial 
lawsuit whether any particular claim will be barred in subsequent litiga-
tion. 
These gains in certainty and predictability hold true even when a par-
ty “loses” during the negotiation. If a defendant, for example, wishes to 
litigate a particular counterclaim at a later time, she can plead the claim 
and then ask the judge to dismiss that counterclaim without prejudice. 
Suppose that the judge declines, reasoning that the counterclaim is part 
of an efficient lawsuit. Unlike in the present regime, the defendant 
would know with absolute certainty that if she wants to litigate that 
claim, she must do so now or else forfeit it forever. 
3. Promoting Party Autonomy. In addition to realizing greater effi-
ciency and predictability, one of the proposal’s most innovative ad-
vantages is the parties’ ability to control the preclusive consequences of 
their litigation. Because of the negotiation, the parties largely have the 
ability to determine how broadly or narrowly preclusion will apply. 
Admittedly, that power is not plenary. It depends on the parties’ ability 
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to agree whether a particular claim should or should not be part of the 
litigation package. Moreover, the judge retains authority to trump that 
agreement, but the judge usually will accord great deference to it. 
In some ways, the newfound autonomy finally will give litigants true 
power over something that they care about most: preclusion and repose. 
Giving the parties a large measure of autonomy dovetails with a model 
of litigation that Professor William Rubenstein described several years 
ago. He argued that complex civil litigation today corresponds less to 
traditional models of adjudication or even managerial judging; instead, it 
is more akin to business deals.166 “What is bought and sold are rights-to-
sue.”167 According to this model, defendants essentially are buying final-
ity and certainty, in some instances before plaintiffs even file a law-
suit.168 Such deal making, though, occurs in the shadow of the rigid idea 
that claim preclusion essentially tracks transactions or occurrences. 
Moreover, there is currently no formal mechanism to prevent one or 
more parties from withholding certain claims—particularly those that 
belong to a distinct transaction or occurrence—and then attempting to 
bring such claims at another time. My proposal offers ways to avoid the 
current formalisms that shape preclusion and also bring greater candor to 
the process. Although the proposal does not necessarily depend on an 
acceptance of Professor Rubenstein’s model, it reflects his insight that 
claim preclusion is often the most important aspect of litigation. Over 
the last century, most jurisdictions have given parties nearly unfettered 
discretion to join as many claims as they want in a single lawsuit. But 
until now litigants have had scant control over what they frequently 
prize most—the repose and certainty that come from preclusion.169 The 
power to shape preclusion’s scope thus offers a significant boon to party 
autonomy. 
Some commentators might recoil at the crassness of characterizing 
the legal system as a marketplace for res judicata, rather than a vital fo-
 
166 William B. Rubenstein, A Transactional Model of Adjudication, 89 Geo. L.J. 371, 416–
18 (2001). Although Professor Rubenstein calls this a “transactional” model—meaning a 
business transaction—I avoid that term in order to avoid confusing his model with the legal 
concept of a “transaction or occurrence,” as I have used the latter term throughout this Arti-
cle. 
167 Id. at 419. 
168 See id. 
169 Admittedly, settlement agreements often include broad waiver provisions. Such waiv-
ers, though, occur outside actual litigation structures and frequently reflect mere predictions 
about what other claims might exist between the parties. 
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rum for resolving both private and public rights.170 Despite many of 
those valid concerns, there is hardly any reason to think that obscuring 
how preclusion operates, or making it less flexible, will promote either 
public or private interests. In fact, quite the opposite is true. Giving par-
ties and courts the power to control preclusion holds the promise of fos-
tering greater candor and transparency in resolving disputes.171 
4. Drawing on Managerial Judges’ Expertise. An important undercur-
rent running through the proposal is a reliance on managerial judging 
and, specifically, a judge’s exercise of discretion in helping craft the 
lawsuit’s structure. The heart of managerial judging lies in a judge’s in-
timate involvement in a lawsuit’s early stages.172 To the extent that a 
significant focus of litigation has shifted from trial to the pretrial phase, 
managerial judges can help shape the litigation and guide the parties to-
ward the most efficient resolution of their disputes. Most scholars identi-
fy the early 1980s as the period when managerial judging acquired new 
significance, largely because of revisions to Federal Rules 16 and 26 that 
explicitly gave judges a more active role in the pretrial stages.173 My 
proposal candidly relies on many of those developments. In particular, it 
explicitly takes advantage of the pretrial conferences and hearings that 
those rules foresee. Although managerial judging has been controversial 
in some respects, my proposal draws on those pretrial devices in order to 
foster greater efficiency, predictability, and autonomy, but in a way that 
respects the traditional judicial role. 
 
170 See, e.g., Catherine R. Albiston & Laura Beth Nielsen, The Procedural Attack on Civil 
Rights: The Empirical Reality of Buckhannon for the Private Attorney General, 54 UCLA L. 
Rev. 1087, 1088 (2007) (noting the importance of private enforcement in order to vindicate 
substantive civil rights laws); Myriam Gilles, Opting Out of Liability: The Forthcoming, 
Near-Total Demise of the Modern Class Action, 104 Mich. L. Rev. 373, 378–79 (2005) (ar-
guing that class action waivers hamper appropriate enforcement of substantive law); J. Maria 
Glover, The Structural Role of Private Enforcement Mechanisms in Public Law, 53 Wm. & 
Mary L. Rev. 1137, 1142 (2012) (noting that “private litigation serves as a complement—
often a crucial one—to public enforcement of various laws”); see also Rubenstein, supra 
note 166, at 431 (noting that his model is “not a normative proposal”).  
171 The proposal has little or no bearing on whether private negotiations and enforcement 
mechanisms will undermine public rights. If anything, the first step of the proposal will en-
courage parties to plead claims and thereby apprise the judge of matters that might have par-
ticular public significance. 
172 See, e.g., Steven S. Gensler, Judicial Case Management: Caught in the Crossfire, 60 
Duke L.J. 669, 677 (2010); Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 375, 393 
(1982). 
173 See, e.g., Gensler, supra note 172, at 676–77; Richard L. Marcus, Slouching Toward 
Discretion, 78 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1561, 1587 (2003). 
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Over the last generation, a rich literature on managerial judging has 
developed. Some scholars have expressed “guarded optimism”174 about 
judges’ potential to guide lawyers in identifying and resolving issues ex-
peditiously.175 The problem, from many critics’ perspective, is that man-
agerial judging has come to include not only more direct engagement 
throughout the discovery stage but also judicial efforts to guide settle-
ment among the parties.176 Such critics argue that managerial judging 
thus perverts the traditional judicial role177 and vests far too much discre-
tion in judges to influence the outcome of litigation.178 Chief among the 
concerns raised by various scholars is the fact that judges (rather than 
parties) typically initiate such management.179 Moreover, managerial 
procedures often are invisible and informal,180 thereby insulating them 
from meaningful appellate review.181 
My proposal obviously requires judges to exercise considerable dis-
cretion during the pretrial stages of litigation. In that sense, it embraces 
the idea that judges, working cooperatively with the parties at an early 
stage of litigation, can identify ways to resolve disputes more efficient-
ly—here, the question of a lawsuit’s appropriate structure. But the pro-
posal’s design avoids the most significant pitfalls that scholars have at-
tributed to managerial judging. For example, it involves a process that is 
largely party-driven. The initial negotiation involves the parties only, not 
 
174 Marcus, supra note 173, at 1605. 
175 See, e.g., Gensler, supra note 172, at 692; Robert F. Peckham, The Federal Judge as a 
Case Manager: The New Role in Guiding a Case from Filing to Disposition, 69 Calif. L. 
Rev. 770, 770–73 (1981). 
176 See, e.g., Jonathan T. Molot, An Old Judicial Role for a New Litigation Era, 113 Yale 
L.J. 27, 43 (2003) (describing settlement conferences as “stray[ing] furthest from the judici-
ary’s traditional adjudicative role”); E. Donald Elliott, Managerial Judging and the Evolution 
of Procedure, 53 U. Chi. L. Rev. 306, 325–26 (1986); Resnik, supra note 172, at 399–402.  
177 See, e.g., Molot, supra note 176, at 118; Resnik, supra note 172, at 414; Stephen N. 
Subrin, Uniformity in Procedural Rules and the Attributes of a Sound Procedural System: 
The Case for Presumptive Limits, 49 Ala. L. Rev. 79, 100–01 (1997).  
178 See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, Who Decides? A Critical Look at Procedural Discretion, 28 
Cardozo L. Rev. 1961, 1963 (2007); Molot, supra note 176, at 40–43; see also Elliott, supra 
note 176, at 317, 325 (noting the potential for judges to abuse discretion and undermine pro-
cedural fairness); Tidmarsh, supra note 78, at 559 (arguing that empirical data suggest that 
discretion “is largely counterproductive”).  
179 See Molot, supra note 176, at 87; Resnik, supra note 172, at 404, 414.  
180 See Resnik, supra note 172, at 407, 413–14; see also Molot, supra note 176, at 84–86 
(describing problems of informality). 
181 See Molot, supra note 176, at 44; Resnik, supra note 172, at 413–14; see also Marcus, 
supra note 173, at 1590 (arguing that “case management escaped frequent oversight by ap-
pellate courts, but a laissez-faire attitude toward lawyer latitude hardly seems preferable”).  
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the judge, and if the parties can agree on the lawsuit’s appropriate scope, 
the court will largely defer to that agreement. Accordingly, the judge 
usually becomes involved only when there is an actual dispute as to 
whether the lawsuit should encompass particular claims. Moreover, 
when the parties call upon a judge to resolve such a dispute, the proceed-
ing bears the traditional hallmarks of judicial formality. The parties pre-
pare a report and brief the court on any disagreements, and the judge 
hears the dispute in open court rather than ex parte or off the record. 
Thus, in nearly every respect, my proposal preserves the traditional judi-
cial role, albeit within the pretrial structures that have become integral to 
managerial judging. 
The one respect in which the proposal might raise concerns among 
the critics of managerial judging is that the judge’s decision about the 
proper scope of litigation generally eludes appellate review. But this is 
one of the classic managerial decisions for which “it is difficult to arouse 
much enthusiasm for appellate review.”182 Judges long have exercised 
discretion over how to shape a lawsuit.183 Such everyday decisions are 
part and parcel of the judicial role. Moreover, appellate review is almost 
entirely unnecessary because the point of my proposal is to preserve all 
claims, provided that the parties have pleaded them at the outset of liti-
gation. The judge is not actually adjudicating a claim or pressuring a 
party to settle or abandon any claim. Precisely because any dismissal of 
claims will be without prejudice, the proposal does not implicate the 
overarching concerns that scholars have raised with respect to other 
forms of managerial judging. To the contrary, while it embraces the new 
architecture of litigation, it respects the traditional judicial role. 
C. Anticipated Objections 
1. Are Efficiency and Autonomy Reconcilable? At first blush, there 
might seem to be an insuperable tension between efficiency and party 
autonomy. Put another way, what a party might perceive as being most 
efficient or desirable might be socially inefficient. In fact, that focus on 
efficiently packaging litigation, notwithstanding a party’s preference for 
a different organization of a lawsuit, was one of the driving forces be-
 
182 Marcus, supra note 173, at 1609. 
183 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) (2012) (power to decline to exercise supplemental juris-
diction over certain claims); Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(b) (power to order separate trials). 
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hind the adoption of transactionalism.184 For example, in one of the clas-
sic cases that articulated the transactional view of claim preclusion, Rush 
v. City of Maple Heights, a plaintiff claimed that the defendant’s negli-
gence had caused $100 in property damage to her motorcycle, and she 
won that initial lawsuit.185 She then sought to take advantage of issue 
preclusion (regarding the defendant’s negligence) in a subsequent law-
suit and received a $12,000 judgment on a personal injury claim.186 De-
spite the plaintiff’s preference for bringing two lawsuits, the Ohio Su-
preme Court held that the two lawsuits stemmed from the same 
transaction and that claim preclusion barred the second suit.187 The fear, 
then, is that parties—left to their own devices—will opt for a level of 
preclusion that is suboptimal. They will bring smaller but more lawsuits 
and thus impose greater costs on society by litigating their grievances 
piecemeal. 
The concern that the party autonomy envisioned by my proposal will 
lead to less efficient litigation is generally unfounded, however. In the 
days before courts adopted the transactional approach to litigation, the 
problem was not party autonomy writ large. Instead, the problem was 
that one party had the unilateral power to split claims. In Rush, for ex-
ample, the plaintiff litigated a small-dollar claim, obtained a favorable 
judgment, and then tried to take advantage of that judgment in a subse-
quent lawsuit regarding a much larger claim (specifically, by arguing 
that the first lawsuit had resolved the question of the defendant’s negli-
gence). That sort of gamesmanship is highly unlikely under my pro-
posal; in fact, it would be pointless. Unlike in the actual Rush case, the 
plaintiff could not hide the ball during the initial lawsuit and dupe the 
defendant into thinking that only a small $100 property claim was at 
stake. Rather, she would have to plead the $12,000 personal injury claim 
as well. Once a plaintiff has shown her cards, the incentive to engage in 
gamesmanship and attempt to split the claims would disappear. Her own 
self-interest in efficiency likely would lead her to want to resolve both 
claims in one proceeding. More importantly, it is highly unlikely that the 
 
184 See, e.g., Casad & Clermont, supra note 7, at 66 (arguing that the modern approach to 
preclusion “seeks to maximize the efficiency of judicial proceedings by encouraging the 
presentation of all grievances that can conveniently and fairly be tried together”). 
185 147 N.E.2d 599, 600 (Ohio 1958). 
186 See id. at 601.  
187 Id. at 599; see also id. at 605 (noting the “vexatious litigation” stemming from the split-
ting of causes of action). In fairness to the plaintiff in Rush, earlier precedent appeared to 
require the piecemeal approach. See Vasu v. Kohlers, Inc., 61 N.E.2d 707, 709 (Ohio 1945). 
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defendant would agree to litigate only the small-dollar claim in the first 
lawsuit. From the defendants’ perspective, there would be no substantive 
advantage to defending the claims in one lawsuit or two; either way, the 
plaintiff would be able to pursue the claims.188 But the defendant’s self-
interest in efficiency, like the plaintiff’s, would lead to a strong desire to 
resolve the matters in just one lawsuit. 
The point is that party autonomy will lead to greater efficiency be-
cause parties enjoy autonomy in shaping preclusion only to the extent 
that they agree whether to include or exclude certain claims. For the rea-
sons just articulated, in a case like Rush, there is hardly any reason to be-
lieve that the parties would agree to an inefficiently narrow lawsuit. By 
contrast, if the parties actually do agree that their lawsuit should be nar-
row in scope, they send a strong signal about the issues that they genu-
inely care about and thus the most efficient way to structure their litiga-
tion. 
Despite my optimism that the levers of party autonomy, as I have 
constructed them in the proposal, will lead to a more efficient litigation 
unit, some cases undoubtedly will arise in which the two goals pull in 
opposite directions.189 In such situations, the judge can intervene. If the 
judge concludes at the scheduling conference that the parties have 
agreed to an inefficient litigation structure—one that ultimately will 
burden the judicial system unnecessarily—the judge can trump the par-
ties’ agreement.190 Such a determination should be based on clear evi-
dence. 
Perhaps cases in which party autonomy does not lead to the most so-
cially efficient litigation structure will become disappointingly ubiqui-
tous, thus belying my optimism. If that worst-case scenario comes to 
pass, all is not lost. A jurisdiction simply will have to decide whether it 
places greater weight on party autonomy to shape preclusion or on social 
efficiency. The proposal, though, lends itself to tweaking along either 
 
188 Theoretically, the defendant might think that the plaintiff wanted to pursue only a $100 
property claim and might never bring a $12,000 personal injury claim. But a rational defend-
ant is likely to recognize that a rational plaintiff probably would not do that. 
189 One possible scenario might arise when each party irrationally overestimates its chanc-
es of prevailing on a particular claim. Such overconfidence might lead the parties to agree to 
narrow the litigation to a single issue on which each believes that it will prevail. 
190 This is most likely to be the case when the parties have agreed to an inefficiently nar-
row litigation structure. In the converse situation—an agreement to litigate too many 
claims—the solution usually will be to order separate trials under Federal Rule 42(b) and 
analogous state provisions. 
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dimension. If the emphasis is on party autonomy, then a court should 
continue to accord substantial deference to any agreement that the par-
ties reach as to the lawsuit’s scope. On the other hand, a state that wishes 
to emphasize social efficiency should still require the parties to negotiate 
what they believe to be the appropriate scope of litigation. As noted 
above, the results of that negotiation can convey valuable information to 
the judge. But if efficiency is the highest value, the judge would owe no 
deference to any agreement that the parties reach and would make an in-
dependent decision about the lawsuit’s appropriate structure. In any 
event, though, the judge’s decision about the lawsuit’s scope still will 
serve a valuable role—apprising the parties of the precise scope of pre-
clusion. 
In the best-case scenario, as I have described it, there will be a 
marked improvement with respect to three principal goals: efficiency, 
predictability, and party autonomy. The worst-case scenario still isn’t 
bad, though, offering significant improvements in two out of the three 
areas. A jurisdiction might have to choose between autonomy and effi-
ciency. But the proposal will achieve newfound predictability, as parties 
no longer will have to guess what the preclusive consequences of their 
litigation will be. 
2. Will the Proposal Lead to More Litigation? One fear might be that 
forcing the parties to join all claims that they have against one another 
could induce parties to litigate more claims than they otherwise would 
choose to.191 Such a course would undermine efficiency and, to a certain 
extent, party autonomy. If the proposal only included a mandatory claim 
joinder rule, parties almost assuredly would litigate an inefficiently high 
number of claims. But the court’s power to dismiss certain claims with-
out prejudice, often at the suggestion of either or both parties, largely 
blunts this criticism. 
The proposal actually makes strides toward eliminating the inefficient 
litigation of claims. Right now, a litigant has an incentive to include any 
claim—even one that the party does not actually want to litigate yet—if 
it even arguably falls within the transaction or occurrence, for fear of 
losing the claim altogether. Dispensing with the transaction or occur-
rence as the organizing principle of lawsuits helps solve the problem. 
Whether a claim is transactionally related to the lawsuit no longer mat-
 
191 See Hazard, supra note 76, at 7 (arguing that many controversies, if left alone, will not 
mature into legal claims). 
TRAMMELL_BOOK (DO NOT DELETE) 9/16/2014 4:12 PM 
1262 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 100:1211 
ters. Instead, the parties can negotiate which claims they actually want to 
litigate and receive clarity from the court about how preclusion will op-
erate. Such clarity arguably might lead to less litigation. Parties no long-
er will face a compulsion to litigate claims that they do not have an im-
mediate interest in trying (and that they may not intend to litigate ever 
but do not want to forfeit). 
Relatedly, there might be a concern that parties will turn around and 
litigate claims that the court dismissed without prejudice, thus undermin-
ing any newfound efficiency. Imagine that Hatfield and McCoy have a 
significant property boundary dispute. They also plead minor property 
damage claims against one another but agree that the judge should dis-
miss those minor claims without prejudice. The judge does so, relying 
on the parties’ representations that those claims are insignificant and 
would not independently lead to litigation. After the lawsuit concludes, 
either party theoretically could return to court immediately to litigate the 
minor claims. In other words, the promise of greater efficiency depends 
on the parties not changing their minds, either out of caprice or venge-
ance. 
The law and psychology literature suggests that my proposal actually 
will foster greater outcome acceptance, such that the parties will not re-
turn to court immediately. For instance, research has revealed that par-
ties’ willingness to accept the results of a lawsuit depends less on the ac-
tual outcome and more on the extent to which the procedures were 
fair.192 The parties’ perceptions of procedural fairness frequently turn on 
the neutrality of the forum and the trustworthiness of the decision mak-
er.193 Most interestingly, for purposes of the proposal, procedural fair-
ness also depends on the extent to which a party believes that it has had 
a voice in the process and some manner of control over procedures.194 
Specifically, the ideal way to foster procedural justice, and thus outcome 
acceptance, is to give parties control over the procedures and then have a 
neutral judge mediate any procedural disputes.195 My proposal fits com-
fortably within that ideal. Consequently, there are good reasons to be-
 
192 See Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, The Psychology of Procedural Justice in Federal 
Courts, 63 Hastings L.J. 127, 149 (2011). 
193 See Tom R. Tyler, Social Justice: Outcome and Procedure, 35 Int’l J. Psychol. 117, 121 
(2000). 
194 See id. 
195 See Kevin M. Clermont, Principles of Civil Procedure § 7.1, at 477–78 (3d ed. 2012) 
(summarizing psychological research). 
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lieve that it will promote outcome acceptance and will not lead to vexa-
tious litigation after the principal lawsuit has concluded. 
3. Will This Create Too Much Work for an Overburdened Judiciary? 
The way that I have conceived the proposal, the additional imposition on 
the judiciary should be minimal. It would function within the current 
pretrial structure of party conferences (without the judge present) and 
scheduling conferences (with the judge). To the extent that the parties 
reach an agreement about the appropriate structure of their lawsuit, the 
judge’s role will be small. In the absence of clear evidence that the par-
ties have chosen a manifestly inefficient litigation structure, the judge 
will defer to the parties’ agreement. 
Even if a judge has to spend additional time considering disputes 
about the scope of the lawsuit, that effort is unlikely to be in vain. Inso-
far as a judge becomes more familiar with the claims, that effort will 
bear fruit later in the litigation when the judge resolves questions about 
the scope of discovery, other pretrial matters, and, in all likelihood, dis-
positive motions.196 
Finally, much of the responsibility for reviewing the parties’ agree-
ments and resolving any disputes about the proper scope of the lawsuit 
probably will fall to magistrate judges, who already resolve many pretri-
al matters.197 Moreover, the stakes are relatively low. If a magistrate or 
trial judge makes a “wrong” decision about which claims to include or 
exclude, neither party suffers prejudice precisely because the proposal 
preserves all claims. 
4. Does New Jersey’s Experiment with the “Entire Controversy” 
Doctrine Suggest Greater Caution? New Jersey has long adopted the 
view that a lawsuit should resolve the “entire controversy” at issue.198 
The entire controversy doctrine traditionally has taken a broader view of 
which claims most logically lend themselves to efficient resolution in a 
single lawsuit, and New Jersey generally enforces that vision through 
 
196 Chief among these dispositive motions is a motion to dismiss. See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 
12(b)(6). 
197 Admittedly, rule makers probably must choose which goal is more important. If the ul-
timate decision maker is to become familiar with issues earlier on, the trial judge should su-
pervise the negotiation. If the goal is to minimize trial judges’ workloads, magistrates should 
take on that responsibility. 
198 See Erichson, supra note 61, at 760–61 (tracing the first references of this view to the 
merger of law and equity in 1947 and more expansive development to the 1980s). 
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strict preclusion principles.199 New Jersey’s most novel and controversial 
experiment, though, came in the 1980s and 1990s when its courts ex-
tended the doctrine to include mandatory party joinder.200 Among the 
most maligned aspects of the doctrine, a legal malpractice claim consti-
tuted part of the same controversy that gave rise to the original law-
suit.201 Thus, failure to join the allegedly negligent attorneys in the origi-
nal litigation meant that preclusion prevented the client from bringing 
the malpractice claim at a later date.202 In response to vociferous criti-
cism by scholars and practitioners, the New Jersey Supreme Court re-
lented.203 Although New Jersey still has a robust mandatory party joinder 
requirement, it comes in a softer, gentler form. New Jersey no longer en-
forces the requirement through preclusion principles.204 
For all of the Sturm und Drang surrounding the mandatory party join-
der rules, New Jersey’s expansive claim joinder rules have proved re-
markably uncontroversial.205 As I mentioned earlier,206 party joinder 
rules, unlike rules concerning claim joinder, present a host of unique 
concerns about fairness and complexity.207 Accordingly, while New Jer-
sey recognized that enforcing party joinder rules through preclusion was 
problematic, it has continued to embrace the notion that preclusion of-
fers an effective way to vindicate an expansive approach to claim join-
der. Moreover, my proposal offers a distinct advantage over the claim 
joinder aspect of New Jersey’s entire controversy doctrine. Unlike in 
 
199 As currently codified, the doctrine provides: “Non-joinder of claims required to be 
joined by the entire controversy doctrine shall result in the preclusion of the omitted claims 
to the extent required by the entire controversy doctrine . . . .” N.J. Ct. R. 4:30A. 
200 See Erichson, supra note 61, at 760–61; Boyle, supra note 123, at 326–36. 
201 See Circle Chevrolet Co. v. Giordano, Halleran & Ciesla, 662 A.2d 509, 513 (N.J. 
1995), abrogated by Olds v. Donnelly, 696 A.2d 633, 634 (N.J. 1997). 
202 See Circle Chevrolet, 662 A.2d at 520. 
203 See Olds, 696 A.2d at 634. 
204 The rules instead focus on providing notice to interested non-parties and enforcing the 
requirement through the imposition of costs rather than preclusion. See N.J. Ct. R. 4:5-1; 
N.J. Ct. R. 4:28-1; N.J. Ct. R. 4:29-1. 
205 See Burrell I. Humphreys, The Reshaping of the Entire Controversy Doctrine: A View 
from the Bench, 9 Seton Hall Const. L.J. 807, 808 (1999) (noting that the claim joinder as-
pect of the entire controversy doctrine “has not been seriously criticized”); see also Erichson, 
supra note 61, at 774 n.96 (noting that “the revisions did not alter mandatory claims joinder 
under the entire controversy doctrine”); Boyle, supra note 123, at 349–50 (same). 
206 See supra note 162. 
207 See Erichson, supra note 61, at 774 (“[I]n comparison to party joinder, joinder of 
claims among those already parties generally creates less complexity and expense, and im-
poses less on extra-litigative values and relationships.”). 
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New Jersey, the negotiation envisioned by the proposed system gives 
parties and courts an opportunity to remove certain claims from the liti-
gation and thereby introduces more flexibility. Although New Jersey’s 
experiment with preclusion-based party joinder offers a cautionary tale, 
its experience with broad claim joinder rules suggests the feasibility of 
my proposal. 
5. Is a Preclusion-Based Approach Unnecessarily Harsh? Despite 
New Jersey’s generally positive experience with broad claim joinder 
rules, which the courts enforce through preclusion principles, one might 
wonder whether a more forgiving approach might be more appropriate. 
Specifically, could my proposal enforce the claim joinder requirement 
through less severe penalties, such as shifting costs to a non-compliant 
party? After all, that is New Jersey’s current preferred mechanism for 
enforcing party joinder rules.208 
If the proposal’s principal goal were to provide notice of certain 
claims, a less severe sanction might be appropriate. The difficulty lies in 
the fact that my proposal aspires to give parties the power to shape the 
preclusive consequences of their litigation. A mandatory claim joinder 
rule, enforced only through a cost-shifting mechanism, would not be the 
most effective way to enable a negotiation over the scope of preclusion. 
In fact, it might lead to a reversion back to the days when one party 
could unilaterally decide to split claims. For example, imagine a situa-
tion akin to Rush—a plaintiff has a low-value property claim and a high-
value personal injury claim. Suppose further that the plaintiff wants to 
withhold the personal injury claim and sue only on the property claim. If 
the only penalty involved certain cost-shifting, the plaintiff might well 
decide that those costs would be a price worth paying in order to split 
the claims. The result would be that the parties could not meaningfully 
negotiate the scope of preclusion. Instead, the plaintiff could act unilat-
erally, split the claims at minimal cost, and effectively impose an ineffi-
cient litigation structure on both the defendant and the court system. To 
my mind, the only way to foster a meaningful negotiation is to require 
that the parties put all of their claims on the table and enforce that re-
quirement through preclusion principles.209 
 
208 See N.J. Ct. R. 4:5-1. 
209 In order to mitigate unnecessary harshness, I have discussed earlier a number of scenar-
ios in which preclusion would not attach to certain claims, usually because a party lacked 
sufficient knowledge that a claim existed. See supra notes 146–60 and accompanying text. 
Most of those examples rely on well-established equitable doctrines, such as tolling. 
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6. Do Limitations on Federal Subject Matter Jurisdiction Prevent 
Federal Courts from Adopting the Proposal? Because federal courts 
have only limited subject matter jurisdiction, there is the problem that a 
court might not have jurisdiction over a claim that my proposal would 
compel a party to plead. To illustrate the potential problem, imagine that 
a plaintiff sues his stockbroker for violating the federal securities stat-
utes; jurisdiction is appropriate because the claim is based on federal 
law.210 The defendant in turn counterclaims against the plaintiff, seeking 
to recover an unrelated debt of $8000. The counterclaim does not satisfy 
the requirements of either federal question jurisdiction (because it is 
based on state law) or diversity jurisdiction (because the counterclaim is 
well below the jurisdictional amount in controversy).211 The only other 
possibility is supplemental jurisdiction, which extends to claims that are 
“so related” to the claims in the original action “that they form part of 
the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Con-
stitution.”212 As most courts have construed that language, supplemental 
jurisdiction is not possible here because the counterclaim is not transac-
tionally related to the plaintiff’s original claim.213 Thus, the potential di-
lemma arises that my proposal would require the defendant to plead a 
counterclaim over which a federal court may not exercise jurisdiction. 
The idea that supplemental jurisdiction requires at least some factual 
connection between the claims is long-standing.214 Its modern incarna-
tion derives from United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, which con-
sidered whether a federal court that had jurisdiction over a federal-law 
claim also could hear a plaintiff’s state-law claim for which there was no 
independent basis of jurisdiction.215 The Supreme Court found that juris-
diction was proper. It held that “the entire action before the court,” in-
cluding both claims, “comprises but one constitutional ‘case’” for pur-
poses of Article III as long as those claims “derive from a common 
nucleus of operative fact.”216 
 
210 See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2012) (federal question jurisdiction). 
211 See id. § 1332(b) (permitting diversity jurisdiction only when the amount in controver-
sy exceeds $75,000). 
212 Id. § 1367(a). 
213 See 13D Wright et al., supra note 43, § 3567.1. 
214 See Kane, supra note 25, at 1732; Matasar, supra note 129, at 1454.  
215 383 U.S. 715, 722 (1966). 
216 See id. at 725. The Court articulated a second requirement—that a party “would ordi-
narily be expected to try [the claims] in one judicial proceeding”—but most commentators 
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When Congress passed the supplemental jurisdiction statute in 1990, 
the consensus was that it had codified Gibbs’s “common nucleus of op-
erative fact” test.217 That test, as virtually every commentator recognizes, 
is rooted in transactionalism.218 Some courts have held that the statute 
allows a slightly looser connection between the claims than the Gibbs 
test had,219 but most courts’ working assumption is that the Constitution 
requires at least some level of transactional relatedness in order for sup-
plemental jurisdiction to be proper.220 That assumption is probably 
wrong, though. 
Over the years, the Supreme Court and other federal courts have al-
lowed supplemental jurisdiction over certain claims that were not factu-
ally related to the original action.221 Professor (now Judge) William 
Fletcher explored one particular type of counterclaim to illustrate this 
point: the defensive set-off. In essence, it allows a defendant to reduce 
the amount he owes to a plaintiff based on a debt that the plaintiff owes 
to the defendant. The basic requirements are that the counterclaim must 
(1) be liquidated or capable of liquidation; (2) stem from a contract or 
judgment; and (3) derive from facts extrinsic to the plaintiff’s claim.222 
Federal courts long have assumed that they have supplemental jurisdic-
tion over defensive set-off counterclaims even though, by definition, 
they are factually unrelated to the plaintiff’s claim.223 Moreover, defen-
sive set-offs were common during the Founding period, suggesting that 
Article III did not define “cases” or “controversies” in terms of factual 
relatedness.224 
 
and courts have treated the requirement as either conclusory or redundant (or both). See 13D 
Wright et al., supra note 43, § 3567.1; Matasar, supra note 129, at 1458.  
217 See 13D Wright et al., supra note 43, § 3567.1. 
218 See, e.g., William A. Fletcher, “Common Nucleus of Operative Fact” and Defensive 
Set-Off: Beyond the Gibbs Test, 74 Ind. L.J. 171, 175 (1998); Kane, supra note 25, at 1732; 
Matasar, supra note 129, at 1453–54. 
219 See, e.g., Jones v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 358 F.3d 205, 213 (2d Cir. 2004); Channell 
v. Citicorp Nat’l Servs., 89 F.3d 379, 385 (7th Cir. 1996); Ammerman v. Sween, 54 F.3d 
423, 424 (7th Cir. 1995). 
220 The Supreme Court itself, albeit in dicta, treated the Gibbs test as constitutionally re-
quired. See Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 371 (1978). 
221 See Matasar, supra note 129, at 1463; see also id. at 1463–77 (cataloging cases). 
222 See 13 Wright et al., supra note 43, § 3523; Fletcher, supra note 218, at 172–73 (articu-
lating elements and collecting cases); Matasar, supra note 129, at 1474–75 (same). 
223 See Fletcher, supra note 218, at 175–77; Matasar, supra note 129, at 1475; cf. Fletcher, 
supra note 218, at 175–76 (noting but criticizing two lower court opinions that question 
whether supplemental jurisdiction extends so far).  
224 See Fletcher, supra note 218, at 177. 
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Although my brief summary cannot do justice to the careful and in-
sightful work by Professors Fletcher and Matasar, their conclusions are 
clear. Any requirement of transactional relatedness in the exercise of 
supplemental jurisdiction is of either a statutory or common-law nature; 
it is not a constitutional requirement.225 Instead, a constitutional “‘case’ 
or ‘controversy’ is measured by federal procedural rules.”226 For purpos-
es of Article III jurisdiction, a case or controversy thus consists of the 
claims and parties that a court lawfully may bring together under the 
various joinder rules, regardless of the extent to which those claims may 
(or may not) be transactionally related. Accordingly, my proposal pre-
sents no constitutional problems. Moreover, because the supplemental 
jurisdiction statute presumptively reaches the full extent allowed by the 
Constitution,227 federal courts already have statutory authority to enter-
tain the full range of claims that my proposal requires the parties to 
plead.228 Admittedly, the Supreme Court will need to recognize that the 
supplemental jurisdiction statute extends further than Congress probably 
anticipated, but the Court’s interpretation of Congress’s language (not 
Congress’s erroneous assumption) ultimately obtains.229 Thus, in all 
likelihood, the Constitution, the relevant statutes, and the Federal Rules 
allow federal courts to adopt my proposal. 
CONCLUSION 
In this Article, I have offered a way to reconceptualize how litigants 
and courts structure lawsuits. Since the early twentieth century, the es-
sential organizing principle has been the “transaction or occurrence,” 
which attempts to forecast the ideal structure of any given lawsuit. De-
spite certain inherent tensions in the idea of transactionalism, it was a 
 
225 See Matasar, supra note 129, at 1491. 
226 Id.; see also Fletcher, supra note 218, at 178 (“[A] broader constitutional test could 
permit supplemental jurisdiction over whatever can be tried as part of a single judicial pro-
ceeding under modem joinder rules.”); Matasar, supra note 129, at 1478–79 (“‘Case’ or 
‘controversy’ as used in article III refers to the limits of joinder of claims and parties set by 
the system of rules lawfully adopted to govern procedure in the federal courts.”). 
227 See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (2012). 
228 A possible wrinkle might include the withdrawal of supplemental jurisdiction from 
claims that a plaintiff asserts against parties joined through certain party-joinder devices. See 
id. § 1367(b). To the extent that problems arise, they are not constitutional in nature and lend 
themselves to resolution by a statutory revision. 
229 See Jones v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 358 F.3d 205, 212 n.5 (2d Cir. 2004) (“Congress’s 
understanding of the extent of Article III is of course not binding as constitutional interpreta-
tion . . . .”); accord 13D Wright et al., supra note 43, § 3567.1. 
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transformative and largely successful idea. As the nature of litigation has 
evolved, though, inefficiency and uncertainty have proliferated. 
I have suggested a way to rethink the approach to structuring lawsuits, 
arguing that increasing party autonomy will serve to enhance the effi-
ciency of litigation. For the first time, parties will have the power to de-
termine exactly how claim preclusion will apply. Moreover, through ne-
gotiated procedure, they will provide the judge with the information 
necessary to construct a socially efficient litigation unit. Finally, my 
proposal will provide clarity that has not existed before, informing the 
parties precisely how preclusion will apply to their lawsuits. Rethinking 
the means of structuring litigation along these lines thus holds the prom-
ise of greater autonomy, efficiency, and predictability. 
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APPENDIX A – CLAIM PRECLUSION 
The following chart details the approach to claim preclusion that the 
fifty states and the District of Columbia have adopted. The approach in 
most states is clear, and the chart cites representative case law, statutes, 
or rules. When a state’s highest court has not directly articulated the 
standard, the chart cites lower state court cases that offer the best evi-
dence of that state’s approach. (Such is the situation, for example, with 
Indiana and Massachusetts.) 
Thirty-four states and the District of Columbia unambiguously or 
quite likely take a transactional approach to claim preclusion. At least 
four others (Iowa, Minnesota, South Carolina, and Washington) do not 
subscribe to the transactional approach but expressly draw on certain el-
ements of transactionalism to guide the analysis. Moreover, South Dako-
ta’s approach—looking to whether the second lawsuit seeks to redress 




Alabama Same Evidence 
Test 
Equity Res. Mgmt. v. Vinson, 
723 So. 2d 634, 636–37 (Ala. 
1998).
Alaska Transactional Alderman v. Iditarod Props., Inc., 
104 P.3d 136, 141 (Alaska 2004). 
Arizona Unclear Fann v. Cardenas, No. 1 CA-CV 
10-0087, 2011 WL 1948921 
(Ariz. Ct. App. May 12, 2011) 
(noting division of authority over 
whether Arizona applies “same 
evidence” or transactional test). 
Arkansas Transactional Golden Host Westchase, Inc. v. 
First Serv. Corp., 778 S.W.2d 
633, 639 (Ark. Ct. App. 1989). 
California Primary Rights 
Theory
Slater v. Blackwood, 543 P.2d 
593, 594 (Cal. 1975).
Colorado Transactional Argus Real Estate, Inc. v. E-470 
Pub. Highway Auth., 109 P.3d 
604, 608–09 (Colo. 2005). 
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Connecticut Transactional Duhaime v. Am. Reserve Life 
Ins. Co., 511 A.2d 333, 335 
(Conn. 1986).
Delaware Transactional LaPoint v. AmerisourceBergen 




Transactional Patton v. Klein, 746 A.2d 866, 
869–70 (D.C. 1999).
Florida Same Evidence 
Test 
Albrecht v. State, 444 So. 2d 8, 
12 (Fla. 1984); see also Fla. 
Power Corp. v. Garcia, 780 
So. 2d 34, 44 (Fla. 2001). 
Georgia Same Evidence 
Test 
Haley v. Regions Bank, 586 
S.E.2d 633, 638–39 (Ga. 2003). 
Hawaii Transactional Kauhane v. Acutron Co., 795 
P.2d 276, 279 (Haw. 1990). 
Idaho Transactional Ticor Title Co. v. Stanion, 157 
P.3d 613, 620 (Idaho 2007). 
Illinois Transactional River Park, Inc. v. City of High-
land Park, 703 N.E.2d 883, 892–
94 (Ill. 1998).
Indiana Same Evidence 
Test 
Afolabi v. Atl. Mortg. & Inv. 
Corp., 849 N.E.2d 1170, 1173–
74 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006); Richter 
v. Asbestos Insulating & Roof-
ing, 790 N.E.2d 1000, 1003 (Ind. 
Ct. App. 2003).
Iowa Unclear. Tradi-







Pavone v. Kirke, 807 N.W.2d 
828, 836–38 (Iowa 2011). 
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Kansas Likely  
Transactional 
Stanfield v. Osborne Indus., 949 
P.2d 602, 611 (Kan. 1997) (not-
ing that the transactional standard 
governs when the first lawsuit 
was in federal court). Other 
courts have cited Stanfield when 
determining the scope of a “cause 
of action” for purposes of Kansas 
claim preclusion standards. See, 
e.g., O’Keefe v. Merrill Lynch & 
Co., 84 P.3d 613, 618 (Kan. Ct. 
App. 2004); Grimmett v. S&W 
Auto Sales Co., 988 P.2d 755, 
759 (Kan. Ct. App. 1999) (“The 
Kansas Supreme Court in [Stan-
field] found that Kansas law does 
not appear to differ significantly 
from the federal law regarding 
preclusion doctrines.”).
Kentucky Transactional Yeoman v. Commonwealth, 983 
S.W.2d 459, 464–65 (Ky. 1998). 
Louisiana Transactional La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13:4231 
(1991).
Maine Transactional Norton v. Town of Long Island, 
2005 ME 109, 883 A.2d 889, 
895.
Maryland Transactional Kent Cnty. Bd. of Educ. v. Bil-
brough, 525 A.2d 232, 237–38 
(Md. 1987).
Massachusetts Transactional Baby Furniture Warehouse Store, 
Inc. v. Meubles D&F Ltee, 911 
N.E.2d 800, 806 (Mass. App. Ct. 
2009); Saint Louis v. Baystate 
Med. Ctr., Inc., 568 N.E.2d 1181, 
1186 (Mass. App. Ct. 1991); see 
also St. Germaine v. Pendergast, 
626 N.E.2d 857, 861 (Mass. 
1993) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
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Michigan Transactional Adair v. State, 680 N.W.2d 386, 
397–98 (Mich. 2004).
Minnesota Same evidence 




Hauschildt v. Beckingham, 686 
N.W.2d 829, 840–41 (Minn. 
2004); see also Brown-Wilbert, 
Inc. v. Copeland Buhl & Co., 732 
N.W.2d 209, 223 (Minn. 2007) 
(citing the transactional test). 
Mississippi Transactional Harrison v. Chandler-Sampson 
Ins., Inc., 891 So. 2d 224, 232–36 
(Miss. 2005).
Missouri Transactional Kesterson v. State Farm Fire & 
Cas. Co., 242 S.W.3d 712, 715–
17 (Mo. 2008).
Montana Transactional Brilz v. Metro. Gen. Ins. Co., 
2012 MT 184, 285 P.3d 494, 
500–02.
Nebraska Same Evidence 
Test 
Baer v. Southroads Mall Ltd. 
P’ship, 566 N.W.2d 734, 738–39 
(Neb. 1997).
Nevada Same Evidence 
Test 
Rosenbaum v. Rosenbaum, 471 
P.2d 254, 256 (Nev. 1970). 
New Hampshire Transactional Sleeper v. Hoban Family P’ship, 
955 A.2d 879, 883 (N.H. 2008). 
New Jersey Transactional N.J. Civ. Prac. R. 4:30A; McNeil 
v. Legislative Apportionment 
Comm’n of State, 828 A.2d 840, 
858–59 (N.J. 2003).
New Mexico Transactional Computer One, Inc. v. Grisham 
& Lawless, P.A., 188 P.3d 1175, 
1183 (N.M. 2008).
New York Transactional Reilly v. Reid, 379 N.E.2d 172, 
175–76 (N.Y. 1978).
North Carolina Unclear, but ap-
pears to take 
same evidence 
approach.
Hayes v. Ricard, 112 S.E.2d 123, 
127 (N.C. 1960). 
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North Dakota Transactional Lucas v. Porter, 2008 ND 160, 
755 N.W.2d 88, 97; Simpson v. 
Chi. Pneumatic Tool Co., 2005 
ND 55, 693 N.W.2d 612, 617.  
Ohio Transactional Grava v. Parkman Twp., 653 
N.E.2d 226, 227, 229 (Ohio 
1995).
Oklahoma Transactional Retherford v. Halliburton Co., 
572 P.2d 966, 968–69 (Okla. 
1977).
Oregon Transactional Bloomfield v. Weakland, 123 
P.3d 275, 279–81 (Or. 2005). 
Pennsylvania Unclear Most analyses are conclusory as 
to whether a second lawsuit in-
volves the same cause of action 
as a prior lawsuit. The Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court has ob-
served that “it is not self-evident 
that the New York [transactional] 
test for res judicata is cotermi-
nous with the approach prevail-
ing in Pennsylvania.” Wilkes ex 
rel. Mason v. Phoenix Home Life 
Mut. Ins. Co., 902 A.2d 366, 401 
(Pa. 2006). The court then noted 
the Pennsylvania requirement 
that there must be an “identity of 
causes of action” but never artic-
ulated a test for determining such 
identity.
Rhode Island Transactional Waters v. Magee, 877 A.2d 658, 
666 (R.I. 2005).
South Carolina Does not en-
dorse one test, 
but includes 
transactional 
approach as one 
of four “fac-
tors.” 
Judy v. Judy, 712 S.E.2d 408, 
414 (S.C. 2011). 
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South Dakota Same Wrongs to 
be Redressed 
Dakota Plains AG Ctr., LLC v. 
Smithey, 772 N.W.2d 170, 179–
80 (S.D. 2009). Courts describe 
the test as “broad” and treat it as 
more encompassing than the 
“same evidence test.” Similar to 
the transactional approach, it is 
based on the same constellation 
of facts.
Tennessee Transactional Creech v. Addington, 281 
S.W.3d 363, 380–81 (Tenn. 
2009).
Texas Transactional Barr v. Resolution Trust Corp. ex 
rel. Sunbelt Fed. Sav., 837 
S.W.2d 627, 630–31 (Tex. 1992). 
Utah Transactional Mack v. Utah State Dep’t of 
Commerce, Div. of Sec., 2009 
UT 47, 221 P.3d 194, 203. 
Vermont Transactional Iannarone v. Limoggio, 2011 VT 
91, 30 A.3d 655, 659–60. 
Virginia Transactional Va. Sup. Ct. R. 1:6(a).
Washington Does not en-
dorse one test, 
but includes 
transactional 
approach as one 
of four “fac-
tors.” 
Marshall v. Thurston Cnty., 267 
P.3d 491, 496 (Wash. Ct. App. 
2011). 
West Virginia Same Evidence 
Test 
Blake v. Charleston Area Med. 
Ctr., Inc., 498 S.E.2d 41, 48–49 
(W. Va. 1997).
Wisconsin Transactional Kruckenberg v. Harvey, 2005 WI 
43, 694 N.W.2d 879, 884–86 
(Wis. 2005).
Wyoming Transactional Foianini v. Brinton, 855 P.2d 
1238, 1240–41 (Wyo. 1993). 
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APPENDIX B – COMPULSORY COUNTERCLAIMS 
The following chart demonstrates that forty states and the District of 
Columbia—listed in normal typeface—have adopted compulsory coun-
terclaim rules akin to Federal Rule 13(a). Although the rules differ in 
certain particulars, they all express the overarching principle that a de-
fendant must plead a transactionally related counterclaim or else forfeit 
that claim in a future lawsuit. The ten italicized states have not adopted 
compulsory counterclaim rules based on the transactional approach.230 
 
Alabama Ala. R. Civ. P. 13(a).
Alaska Alaska R. Civ. P. 13(a).
Arizona Ariz. R. Civ. P. 13(a).
Arkansas Ark. R. Civ. P. 13(a).
California Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 426.30(a) (West 2014). 
Colorado Colo. R. Civ. P. 13(a).
Connecticut See, e.g., Hansted v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 562 
A.2d 1148, 1151 n.4 (Conn. App. Ct. 1989). 
Delaware Del. Super. Ct. R. Civ. P. 13(a).
District of 
Columbia
D.C. Super. Ct. R. Civ. 13(a). 
Florida Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.170(a).
Georgia Ga. Code Ann. § 9-11-13(a) (2013).
Hawaii Haw. R. Civ. P. 13(a).
Idaho Idaho R. Civ. P. 13(a).
Illinois See 735 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/2-608 (West 2010); 
see also, e.g., Kasny v. Coonen & Roth, Ltd., 924 
N.E.2d 1103, 1107 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009).
 
230 Among the ten states that deem all counterclaims to be permissive, some have express-
ly adopted or favorably alluded to the so-called common law compulsory counterclaim rule. 
The common law rule prevents a party from later bringing a counterclaim, even a supposedly 
permissive counterclaim, that “would nullify the initial judgment or would impair rights es-
tablished in the initial action.” Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 22(2)(b) (1982); see 
also, e.g., Kasny v. Coonen & Roth, Ltd., 924 N.E.2d 1103, 1107 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009) (allud-
ing to a version of claim preclusion that would prevent a defendant from later litigating a 
claim that would “nullify the judgment entered in the initial action”); Menard, Inc. v. Lite-
way Lighting Prods., 698 N.W.2d 738, 745 (Wis. 2005) (noting that Wisconsin has adopted 
the common law compulsory counterclaim rule); Rowland v. Harrison, 577 A.2d 51, 53–58 
(Md. 1990) (expressly considering the applicability of the common law counterclaim rule). 
However, the common law rule is significantly narrower than the transactional approach that 
the forty states and the District of Columbia have embraced. 
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Indiana Ind. Trial Proc. R. 13(a).
Iowa Iowa Code R. 1.241.
Kansas Kan. Stat. 60-213(a).
Kentucky Ky. R. Civ. P. 13.01.
Louisiana La. Code Civ. Proc. Ann. art. 1061 (2006).
Maine Me. R. Civ. P. 13(a).
Maryland See Md. R. 2-331(a), 3-331(a); see also, e.g., Fairfax 
Sav., F.S.B. v. Kris Jen Ltd. P’ship, 655 A.2d 1265, 
1270 (Md. 1995).
Massachusetts Mass. R. Civ. P. 13(a).
Michigan See Mich. Ct. R. 2.203(A). A defendant need not 
bring any counterclaims; however, once a defendant 
pleads one counterclaim, the defendant must plead 
all transactionally related counterclaims. See, e.g., 
Gross v. Landin, No. 246282, 2004 WL 1908124, at 
*6 (Mich. Ct. App. Aug. 26, 2004).
Minnesota Minn. R. Civ. P. 13.01.
Mississippi Miss. R. Civ. P. 13(a).
Missouri Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 55.32(a).
Montana Mont. R. Civ. P. 13(a).
Nebraska Neb. Ct. R. Pldg. §§ 6-1113(a), (b); see also 5 Ne-
braska Practice, Civil Procedure § 13:8.
Nevada Nev. R. Civ. P. 13(a).
New Hampshire N.H. Super. Ct. Civ. R. 10(a).
New Jersey N.J. Ct. R. 4:7-1; N.J. Ct. R. 4:30A.
New Mexico N.M. Rule 1-013(A).
New York N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3019 (McKinney 2013); see also, e.g., 
Textile Tech. Exch., Inc. v. Davis, 611 N.E.2d 768, 
769 (N.Y. 1993).
North Carolina N.C. R. Civ. P. 13(a).
North Dakota N.D. R. Civ. P. 13(a).
Ohio Ohio R. Civ. P. 13(A).
Oklahoma Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 2013(A) (West 2011). 
Oregon Or. R. Civ. P. 22(A); see also, e.g., State ex rel. Eng-
lish ex rel. Sellers v. Multnomah Cnty., 238 P.3d 
980, 989 (Or. 2010).
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Pennsylvania Pa. R. Civ. P. 1031; see also, e.g., Birdsboro Mun. 
Auth. v. Reading Co. & Wilmington & N. R.R., 758 
A.2d 222, 225 n.3 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000).
Rhode Island R.I. Super. R. Civ. P. 13(a).
South Carolina S.C. R. Civ. P. 13(a).
South Dakota S.D. Codified Laws § 15-6-13(a) (1966).
Tennessee Tenn. R. Civ. P. 13.01.
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